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Abstract
We propose and analyze a general model of priority races. Researchers privately
have breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before disclosing
them, thereby establishing priority. Two-researcher, symmetric priority races have a
unique equilibrium that can be characterized by a differential equation. We study
how the shape of the breakthrough distribution and of the returns to maturation
affect maturation delays and research quality, both in dynamic and comparative-statics
analyses. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them
has contrasted effects on research quality. Being closer to the technological frontier
enhances the value of maturation for researchers, which mitigates the negative impact
on research quality of the race for priority. Finally, when researchers differ in their
abilities to do creative work or in the technologies they use to develop their ideas,
more efficient researchers always let their ideas mature more than their less efficient
opponents. Our theoretical results shed light on academic competition, patent races,
and innovation quality.
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1 Introduction
As emphasized by Merton (1957), one of the primary concerns of scientists is to establish
priority of discovery by being first to disclose an advance in knowledge. The recognition for
being first depends on the importance attached to the discovery by the scientific community
and comes in different forms, from publications and grants to awards or prizes of various
prestige.1 The situation is similar for inventors, who can establish their claim to being first
to achieve breakthrough innovation by filing for a patent.
Whereas, as pointed out by Dasgupta and David (1987, 1994), the priority system is
essential for granting intellectual property rights to both scientists and inventors, it leaves
little room for runner-ups, leading to a highly skewed distributions of rewards. There may
valid efficiency reasons for this inequality in rewards, because, as observed by Dasgupta and
Maskin (1987) the winning research unit is usually the main contributor to social surplus.
Inequality in rewards may also be efficient in inducing certain types of effort, as emphasized
in the contest literature.2 However, this winner-take-all feature increases researchers’ fear of
preemption and hence their perceived need to publish quickly or to rush patent applications.
For instance, according to Stephan (1996), “The probability of being scooped is a constant
threat” in academic competition and, as a result, “It is not unknown for scientists to write
and submit an article in the same day.” The intensity of this race for priority naturally raises
the question of the quality of research outputs, which is of great concern given the driving
role of research and innovation emphasized by the endogenous-growth literature.3
This tension between research quality and preemption risk is relevant in most innovative
sectors. Consider first a scientist developing a new theory. Should she publish preliminary
results to ensure priority against her potential opponents, for fear that her idea increasingly
becomes “in the air”? Or should she wait to present a more mature theory by increasing the
amount of evidence in favor of it and answering most likely objections before publishing?4
Consider next a software company developing a new application. Should it launch it on
the market at the earliest opportunity? Or should it wait to verify that the software is
completely free of bugs and to develop the interface to make it user-friendly and compatible
with other applications? Consider finally a pharmaceutical firm working on a promising
new molecule, a breakthrough it keeps secret to avoid duplication by potential competitors.
How many tests should it conduct to assess the impact of the molecule and its possible side
1See Stephan and Levin (1992) for a discussion of rewards for scientific achievements.
2See, for instance, Lazear and Rosen (1981), or Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
3See, for instance, Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
4A case in point is the publication by Charles Darwin of his theory of evolution through natural selection.
After his attention was drawn in 1856 to a paper by the naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace on the “introduction
of new species,” Darwin was torn between the desire to produce a complete account of his theory and its
applications, and the urgency of publishing a short paper summarizing its main insights. It is only when,
upon receiving in 1858 a second parcel from Wallace, Darwin realized that he had been “forestalled” and
thus was running the risk of losing priority, that he decided to “publish a sketch of [his] general views in
about a dozen pages or so” (Darwin (1887, pages 116–117)). In the end, Darwin’s and Wallace’s papers were
jointly read at the Linnean Society on July 1, 1858 (Desmond and Moore (1991)).
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effects before submitting a new drug application? The more tests are run, the higher the
effectiveness and safety of the final drug and, therefore, the probability that the submission
will be successful, but the higher the risk that a competitor preempts by putting a substitute
product on the market.
The objective of this paper is to offer a parsimonious yet flexible theoretical framework
allowing one to study the impact of the race for priority on individual research strategies
and innovation quality. Our model builds on three stylized features of priority races that
can be abstracted from the above examples.
First, having a breakthrough is not in itself sufficient to deliver an accomplished piece
of scientific work, a marketable product, or a valuable innovation. That is, one of the
determinants of the final quality of new ideas is the time spent maturing them. This shifts
the focus of the analysis to the tradeoff faced by researchers between letting their ideas
mature optimally and risking being preempted by their opponents.
Second, breakthroughs are privately observed by researchers, if only because they have
an incentive to keep their research agendas secret to avoid being imitated and let their
ideas mature in relative safety. A consequence of this is that, to some extent, a researcher
developing a new idea works in the dark: she does not know whether she has an active
opponent until it is too late and she realizes she has been preempted.
Third, the context in which new ideas are first discovered and then developed changes
over time. Among the relevant factors are the by-products of economic growth itself, such
as technological progress, human-capital accumulation, improved access to information or
innovations in related fields, and more efficient institutions. As a result, there is an inherent
nonstationarity in the innovation process.
In line with these broad features, we propose to model priority races as Bayesian games
in which researchers first exogenously have breakthroughs that they each privately observe,
and then choose how long to let their ideas mature before disclosing them. Depending on
the interpretation of the model, disclosure may consist in submitting a paper to a scientific
journal, filing for a patent, or putting a new product on the market. In analogy with an
auction, our model is thus fully specified by two functions.
The first is the distribution of researchers’ breakthrough times, which describes how
good they are at discovering new ideas. The rate at which breakthroughs occur can vary
over time. Such variations may reflect the evolution of technology or human capital, the
growth of the research community, or exogenous fashion trends that dictate whether a given
area of research becomes “hotter” or “colder” over time.5
The second is the payoff from being first, which describes the returns to maturation.
These returns may depend on technological factors, such as how good researchers are at
5Building on Kuhn’s (1962) terminology, Stephan (1996) notes that, in academic competition, the former
scenario is particularly likely “in the case of “normal” science where the accumulated knowledge and focus
necessary for the next scientific breakthrough is “in the air”,” while the latter scenario may arise because
“Scientists [can choose to] minimize the threat of being scooped by choosing to work on problems that fall
outside the mainstream of “normal science” or by working in the “backwaters” of research.”
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developing new ideas. But they may also be affected by the institutional context in which
research takes place, such as the efficiency of scientific journals and patent offices, or the
steepness of the incentives faced by researchers. Our model is flexible enough to allow for
technological progress or institutional change.
Our main theoretical contribution is that, in the two-researcher, symmetric case, the
priority race admits a unique equilibrium that is characterized by a differential equation
subject to a specific boundary condition. This equation reflects the tension between the rate
at which a researcher’s payoff from being first grows as her idea matures and the rate at
which her opponent has breakthroughs. It is used throughout the paper to derive the main
economic implications of the model.
The evolution of the breakthrough rate is key to the qualitative features of equilibrium.
When breakthroughs become more frequent, researchers are under increasing competitive
pressure and have decreasing incentives to wait and let their ideas mature. Thus ideas
developed later on are less elaborated than ideas developed earlier on. This points at a
new kind of Schumpeterian effect: by making researchers better at discovering new ideas
over time, growth may have a detrimental effect on innovation quality by intensifying the
race for priority that takes place between them. This leads scientists to publish “quick-and-
dirty” papers or inventors to prematurely patent their innovations. Hence, whereas a broad
prediction of endogenous-growth models is that higher innovativity has a positive impact
on innovation and in turn on growth,6 the reverse prediction holds in our model because
of increased preemption risk. An important countervailing effect on the quality of research
output is that researchers, because of growth-induced technological progress or institutional
change, may become better at developing their ideas or may face steeper incentives. Then
researchers’ marginal gain of letting their ideas mature relative to the potential loss if they
are preempted is higher. In contrast with an increase in the breakthrough rate, such increases
in research projects’ growth potential reduce researchers’ fear of preemption and slow down
the maturation process.
This tension between the prospection phase, in which researchers have breakthroughs,
and the development phase, in which researchers let their breakthroughs mature, raises
the question of the quality of research outputs. If the development technology does not
change over time, a decline in maturation delays is associated to a decline in quality. This
increasing relationship need no longer hold if the development technology improves over
time. For instance, better access to relevant information or improved technology is likely
to reduce the time necessary to bring an idea to the same level of development; as a result,
hours spent developing a late breakthrough are likely to be more productive than those spent
developing an early breakthrough. To formalize this idea, we develop an explicit model of
research quality in which researcher’s returns to maturation depend on when they have
breakthroughs. This allows us, in particular, to study the impact of the distance to the
technological frontier on the quality of research output. We show that, the more researchers
6See, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2005).
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can benefit from ongoing technological progress while developing their breakthroughs, the
higher the quality of their output, even though they may end up devoting less time to this
task. This reflects that being closer to the frontier enhances the value of maturation, which
mitigates the negative impact of the race for priority.
Whereas our basic model focuses on symmetric priority races, research contests feature in
practice important asymmetries (Stephan (1996)). First, researchers differ in their abilities to
do creative work; that is, in our terminology, more innovative researchers have more frequent
breakthroughs. Second, researchers differ in their motivations or in the technologies they
use to develop their ideas; that is, in our terminology, researchers may engage in projects
with more or less growth potential. We show that a common feature of these two dimensions
of heterogeneity is that more efficient researchers always let their ideas mature more than
their less efficient opponents. Thus, for instance, speed of discovery and quality of research
output are positively correlated. An important difference, however, is that widening the
gap between more and less innovative researchers increases the risk of preemption and thus
tends to deteriorate the overall quality of research outputs; by contrast, increasing the growth
potential of some researchers’ projects, for instance by subjecting them to steeper incentive
schemes or by rewarding them more for long-term performance, mitigates the impact of
preemption risk and thus tends to enhance the overall quality of research outputs.
Related Literature A first way to model competition among researchers is to represent it
as a contest, in line with Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), or Dasgupta
and Maskin (1987). In these models, each contestant makes an ex-ante effort or project-
choice decision, which stochastically influences the quality of her individual output. The
winner is the contestant who offers the highest-quality output. Lazear and Rosen (1981)
provide conditions under which a well-chosen prize for winning the contest induces first-best
effort choices, while the compensation for runner-ups is set so as to induce participation
to the contest. In a model of research-portfolio choices, Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) show
that researchers may select projects having an expected yield higher than the expected yields
of the projects in an efficient portfolio, reflecting that each researcher is induced to spend
more than is socially efficient so as to give herself a better chance of winning the contest.
Besides being explicitly dynamic, our model of quality is different in that, instead of making
an ex-ante decision, each researcher can condition her maturation decision on her privately-
observed breakthrough time. This leads to the reverse prediction that, to ensure priority,
researchers may be lead to downgrade the quality of their output.
It is also interesting to contrast our assumptions and results to those of the literature
on R&D races with step-by-step innovation (Harris and Vickers (1987), Aghion, Harris,
and Vickers (1997), and Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001)). In these models,
researchers control the intensity with which they have breakthroughs, but not the value
of a breakthrough; in particular, there is no role for maturation. Correspondingly, the
patent race, or any of its steps, is over as soon as a breakthrough occurs, an event which is
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assumed to be publicly observable. Our model is dual in that breakthroughs are exogenous,
but researchers can enhance the quality of their ideas by choosing how long to let them
mature; this, in turn, is made possible by the fact that breakthroughs are privately observed.
As a result, the impact of an increase in competition is different. Indeed, in R&D races
with step-by-step innovation, an increase in product-market competition fosters innovation
by increasing the incremental value of innovation, an “escape-competition” effect. In our
model, an increase in the competitive pressure, as measured by the breakthrough rate, not
only increases innovativity, but also the disclosure of innovations. But the interpretation
is different because, for a fixed development technology, shorter maturation delays lead to
lower-quality research outputs. This suggests, in particular, that one should be cautious in
interpreting an increase in the patent rate as a positive indicator of R&D productivity, as it
may only reflect an intensification of the race for priority.
From a theoretical viewpoint, this paper belongs to the literature on preemption games,
that is, timing games with a first-mover advantage. In a seminal paper on the strategic
adoption of new technology, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show in a complete-information
setting that there always exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which firms’ payoffs are
equalized and rents are fully dissipated. This does not arise in our setting because wasteful
competition is alleviated by the asymmetry of information between players. As a result,
there is a genuine tradeoff between the gains from letting one’s project mature and the risk
of preemption. Weeds (2002), extending Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1985) analysis, studies a
real-option model of R&D competition in which firms invest into research projects. Once the
decision to invest has been made by a firm, a breakthrough occurs randomly at a time that is
drawn from an exponential distribution. The first firm that has a breakthrough immediately
wins the R&D race, as in R&D races with step-by-step innovation. By contrast, breakthrough
times in our model are the researchers’ private information and our analysis focuses on
the endogenous wedge between the occurrence of a breakthrough and the disclosure of the
corresponding research.
The idea that players in preemption games may face uncertainty about whether they have
active competitors has first been introduced by Hendricks (1992), who extends Fudenberg
and Tirole’s (1985) analysis to the case where it is determined at the outset of the game
whether firms are innovators or imitators, in which case they cannot move first. Innovators
have an incentive to build a reputation for being imitators, which alleviates rent dissipation;
they reveal their information gradually by playing according to a mixed strategy. Bobtcheff
and Mariotti (2012) consider a setting closer to the one developed in the present paper,
in which players randomly and secretly come into play; they show that all equilibria give
rise to the same distribution for each player’s moving time. However, in their model, as in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Hendricks (1992), the payoff a player derives from being
first only depends on calendar time and not, as in our model, on the time elapsed since she
had a breakthrough; as a result, a player who comes into play late is not at a disadvantage
relative to one who came into play earlier on but did not make a move in the meanwhile.
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By contrast, we consider situations in which ideas take time to mature, which is a more
appropriate assumption in the case of priority races.
Closely related to this paper, Hopenhayn and Squintani (2014) consider a sequential
model of R&D races in which research builds on previously patented products. In a given
race, firms have breakthroughs at a constant common rate, and decide when to disclose them
and file for a patent. A constant proportion of firms is randomly selected to participate in
each race. Therefore, a firm that joins in a race does not know whether it will take part in the
subsequent ones. There exists a symmetric equilibrium in which firms wait a constant amount
of time following a breakthrough. This allows for detailed comparative-statics analyses and
for an explicit comparison between the equilibrium outcome and the social optimum. Weaker
patents may be socially beneficial, as they reduce competition and lead firms to postpone
patenting. Our model is simpler in that we focus on a single race. However, by allowing for
arbitrary breakthrough distributions and time-dependent payoff functions, we can study how
researchers’ strategies evolve in nonstationary environments in which their ability to discover
and develop new ideas changes over time. Another distinctive feature of our analysis is to
study the impact of heterogeneity among researchers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides
our main characterization result. Section 4 draws the economic implications of the model.
Section 5 extends the analysis to a class of asymmetric priority races. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The General Framework
Time is continuous and indexed by t ≥ 0. There are two symmetric players, a and b. In
what follows, i refers to an arbitrary player and j to her opponent. Player i comes into
play at some random time τ˜ i at which she has a breakthrough. Calendar time is common
knowledge; time zero can be interpreted as the date of a common knowledge event, such as
a pioneering discovery, that in turn enables players to have breakthroughs.7
2.1.1 Actions and Payoffs
Each player i has a single opportunity to make a move. Making a move consists for player i
in disclosing her research, thereby establishing priority. As in Bobtcheff and Mariotti (2012)
and Hopenhayn and Squintani (2014), this must occur at some time ti ≥ τ˜ i, for a maturation
delay ti− τ˜ i. We say that player i preempts player j if ti < tj. To capture the winner-take-all
feature of priority races emphasized by Merton (1957), we assume that, in that case, player
j’s payoff is zero.
Player i’s payoff from preempting player j first depends on her maturation delay, reflecting
7Hence players’ clocks are synchronized, unlike in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Brunnermeier and
Morgan (2010), or Barbos (2015).
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that a development period is necessary to bring a breakthrough to fruition. It may also
depend on her breakthrough time, reflecting that the development technology is susceptible
to change over time. Formally, consider player i with breakthrough time τ i. Then the present
value, evaluated at time τ i, of her preempting player j at time ti is L(ti−τ i, τ i).8 This present
value is lowered to αL(ti− τ i, τ i), for some α ∈ [0, 1], if players i and j simultaneously make
a move at time ti.
We first describe how payoffs vary with maturation delays for a fixed breakthrough time.9
Assumption 1 The function L is continuous over [0,∞) × [0,∞) and thrice continuously
differentiable over (0,∞)× (0,∞). For each τ, there exists M(τ) > 0 such that
L(0, τ) = 0 and L(m, τ) > 0 if m > 0,
L1(m, τ) > 0 if M(τ) > m > 0 and L1(m, τ) < 0 if m > M(τ),
L11(M(τ), τ) < 0.
Hence some maturation time is required for a time-τ breakthrough to have positive
value,10 whereas maturing it more than M(τ) is counterproductive. We refer to M(τ) as to
the stand-alone maturation delay for a player with breakthrough time τ who would not be
threatened by preemption.11 By contrast, if it were common knowledge that both players
had a breakthrough at time τ , each player at time τ would be indifferent between making
a move or abstaining. Subgame-perfect-equilibrium maturation delays would then be zero,
leading to full dissipation of players’ rents.12
We next restrict the cross effects of maturation delays and breakthrough times on payoffs.
Assumption 2 For each τ,
(lnL)11(m, τ) < (lnL)12(m, τ), M(τ) ≥ m > 0.
Equivalently, the mapping (t, τ) 7→ L(t − τ, τ) is strictly log-supermodular over the
relevant range: the relative returns to increasing the moving time t are increasing in the
breakthrough time τ . This form of complementarity captures the idea that progress in
the development technology is not too drastic. In particular, each player’s stand-alone
moving time, τ +M(τ), is strictly increasing in τ , despite the fact that a player with a late
breakthrough may have access to a better development technology.
8This specification of payoffs encompasses Hopenhayn and Squintani’s (2014), in which the payoff only
depends on the maturation delay m, while Bobtcheff and Mariotti (2012) study a limit case where the payoff
only depends on the moving time τ +m.
9Throughout the paper, we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives and dots to denote time derivatives.
10This assumption, which is mathematically convenient to establish Lemmas 1–2 below, may seem strong
as it rules out that ideas may immediately have value. Note, however, that any payoff function Lˆ(·, 0) with
Lˆ(0, τ) > 0 and that otherwise satisfies all our assumptions can be arbitrarily closely approximated by a
function L(·, τ) that satisfies all our assumptions, including the requirement that L(0, τ) = 0. All that is
takes is that is that the slope of L(·, τ) in the neighborhood of zero be large enough.
11We borrow this terminology from Katz and Shapiro (1987).
12See Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) or Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) for a formalization of this result.
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2.1.2 Information
The players’ breakthrough times τ˜a and τ˜ b are independently drawn from a continuously
differentiable distribution G with positive density G˙ over [0,∞).13 Given our interpretation
of time zero, the independence of breakthrough times should be understood conditionally
on the event that takes place at this time and makes breakthroughs possible. Whereas the
breakthrough distribution is common knowledge, the breakthrough time of each player is her
private information, or type. Thus, as in Hendricks (1992), Bobtcheff and Mariotti (2012),
or Hopenhayn and Squintani (2014), competition is only potential: a player never knows she
has an active opponent until it is too late and she has been preempted. Unlike in Hopenhayn
and Squintani (2014), the rate at which players have breakthroughs can vary over time.
2.1.3 Strategies and Equilibria
A strategy for player i is a function σi : [0,∞) → [0,∞) that specifies, for each possible
value τ i of her breakthrough time, the time σi(τ i) ≥ τ i at which she plans to make a move.
Player i’s payoff if her type is τ i, player j’s strategy is σj, and player i plans to make a move
at time ti ≥ τ i is
V i(ti, τ i, σj) ≡ {P[σj(τ˜ j) > ti] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = ti]}L(ti − τ i, τ i). (1)
A pair (σa, σb) is an equilibrium if for all i, τ i, and ti ≥ τ i,
V i(σi(τ i), τ i, σj) ≥ V i(ti, τ i, σj). (2)
Because players’ breakthrough and moving times can be arbitrarily large, the only zero-
probability events in equilibrium could be some player unexpectedly making a move. As this
effectively terminates the game, any equilibrium is Bayesian perfect.
2.1.4 Comparison with First-Price Auctions
As is clear from the definition (1) of payoffs, our priority race bears a strong formal analogy
with a first-price procurement auction with risk-averse bidders (Arozamena and Cantillon
(2004)): in this context, τ i is bidder i’s monetary cost of providing a good, ti is the price
offered by bidder i, and L is the bidders’ common utility function for wealth. However, our
model has three novel features. First, and most importantly for the scope of our results,
the payoff function L is type- and hence time-dependent, reflecting that the development
technology may be nonstationarity in our setting. Second, unlike a standard utility function
for wealth, each payoff function L(·, τ) reaches a maximum at the stand-alone maturation
delay M(τ). Third, whereas costs in procurement-auction models are typically distributed
over a bounded interval, or there is a reserve price set by the buyer, breakthrough times
13This is in line with patent-race models, which typically assume an infinite horizon. By contrast, it would
be somewhat artificial to assume that players’ productive lifespan is both finite and commonly known.
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in our model can take arbitrarily large values. As we shall see in Section 3, these last two
features imply that, although the differential equation that characterizes equilibrium is the
same in our model as in a first-price procurement auction, the boundary condition it is
subject to is of a very different nature and calls for a specific analysis.
2.2 Examples
The following examples suggest the applicability of our general framework. We will use them
in Section 4 to illustrate the economic implications of our model.
2.2.1 Example 1: Publication Delays and Patent Allowances
In academics, a benefit of more maturation time is faster publication. Specifically, let us
interpret m as the delay between a breakthrough and the first submission for publication.
Submission guarantees priority, but a publication delay D(m, τ) adds to the maturation
delay m, reflecting the number and length of refereeing rounds.14 We assume that there are
positive returns to maturation, D1 < 0: the more elaborate the submission, the shorter the
publication delay. We also assume that there are decreasing returns to maturation, D11 > 0,
and that very immature works get stuck in the publication process, limm↓0 {D(m, τ)} = ∞
for all τ . Researchers compete for a unit publication prize and discount future rewards
at rate r, so that L(m, τ) = exp(−r[m + D(m, τ)]). Then M(τ) minimizes total time
m + D(m, τ) from breakthrough to publication.15 An alternative interpretation is that
players are inventors who choose how long to wait before applying for a patent. Then, the
more elaborate the application, the higher the probability pi ≡ exp(−rD) that it succeeds.16
2.2.2 Example 2: Journal Rankings and Researchers’ Incentives
In academics, another benefit of more maturation time is to allow one to publish her work in
more prestigious outlets. Specifically, let journals be continuously ranked over [0,∞). There
is some noise in the publication process: a paper matured for m time units is published in
journal J(m, ε˜), for some exogenous random variable ε˜. We assume that there are positive
returns to maturation, J1 > 0: for any realization of ε˜, the more elaborate the paper,
the higher the rank of the journal in which it is published. We also assume that very
immature papers are published in the worst outlet, J(0, ε) = 0 for all ε. A researcher’s
instantaneous payoff from preempting her opponent depends on the final outlet j through a
reward function S(j, τ) such that S(0, τ) = 0 for all τ , which stands for monetary incentives,
14Alternatively, D(m, τ) can be interpreted as the time it takes the profession to recognize the importance
of a paper’s contribution.
15Assumption 1 follows from D1 < 0 and D11 > 0. Assumption 2 moreover requires that D11 > D12 over
the relevant range.
16Empirically, this allowance rate is significantly different from 1. Carley, Hegde, and Marco (2015)
document that, between 1996 and 2005, 55.8% of US patent applications ended up in a patent without
continuation procedures, and that only 11.4% did so without further examination.
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career prospects, or future funding for research. Researchers discount future rewards at rate
r, so that L(m, τ) = exp(−rm)E[S(J(m, ε˜), τ)].
2.2.3 Example 3: Innovation Quality
Our setting is more generally suited for the study of innovation quality. We just sketch
here the relevant model, which is described in more detail in Section 4.2. Let Q(m, τ) be
the quality of an innovation achieved by a researcher with breakthrough time τ who spends
m time units maturing her breakthrough; quality may depend on the breakthrough time
because of progress in the development technology. A researcher’s instantaneous payoff from
preempting her opponent depends on the achieved level of quality q through an inverse
demand function P (q). Researchers discount future rewards at rate r, so that L(m, τ) =
exp(−rm)P (Q(m, τ)).
3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we establish that the general priority race described in Section 2.1 has a
unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is characterized as the unique solution to an ordinary
differential equation (ODE) subject to an appropriate boundary condition. We will rely on
this characterization result to spell out the economic implications of our model in Section 4.
3.1 The Fundamental ODE
We first establish three intuitive yet useful properties of equilibria.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium,
(i) 0 < σi(τ i)− τ i ≤M(τ i) for all i and τ i.
(ii) σi is strictly increasing for all i.
(iii) σa(0) = σb(0).
Property (i) is twofold. First, a player always prefers to wait before making a move
in equilibrium because, no matter when she does so, her opponent’s breakthrough may
occur later on and thus represent no threat. Second, there is no point for her in waiting
longer than in the absence of competition because slightly reducing her maturation delay
would then strictly increase her payoff from preempting while not increasing preemption
risk. Property (ii) in its weak form follows from a revealed-preference argument, using the
complementarity between breakthrough and moving times encapsulated in Assumption 2.
That any equilibrium must be separating follows from the fact that, if there were an atom at
ti in the equilibrium distribution of player i’s moving time, then player j would never want
to make a move at ti or slightly later than ti, for fear of being preempted. This would imply
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that player i faces no preemption risk over some time interval starting at ti and thus that
some types of player i who make a move at ti would be strictly better off waiting slightly
longer to do so. Finally, property (iii) reflects that, if one had σi(0) < σj(0), player i, were
she to have a breakthrough at time zero, would be strictly better off waiting slightly longer
to make a move while still avoiding preemption risk.
For each i, let φi ≡ (σi)−1 be the inverse of σi, which is well defined and continuous over
σi([0,∞)) by Lemma 1(ii). Also let σ(0) ≡ σa(0) = σb(0), which is well defined by Lemma
1(iii). Then the following regularity result holds.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium,
(i) σi is continuous, so that σi([0,∞)) = [σ(0),∞).
(ii) φi is differentiable over [σ(0),∞).
We use Lemma 2(ii) to derive a system of ODEs for the inverses φa and φb of σa and σb.
Because σa and σb are strictly increasing according to Lemma 1(ii), and the breakthrough
distribution has no atom by assumption, the probability of a tie is zero. Given (1), the
problem faced by type τ i of player i can then be written as
max
ti∈[τ i,∞)
{P[σj(τ˜ j) > ti]L(ti − τ i, τ i)} = max
ti∈[τ i,∞)
{[1−G(φj(ti))]L(ti − τ i, τ i)}. (3)
We know from Lemma 1(i) that a zero maturation delay is inconsistent with equilibrium, so
that the solution to problem (3) must be interior. The first-order condition is
[1−G(φj(ti))]L1(ti − τ i, τ i) = G˙(φj(ti))φ˙j(ti)L(ti − τ i, τ i).
Thus player i with breakthrough time τ i balances the expected marginal benefit from an
infinitesimal additional delay dti, which is equal to the probability that player j plans to
make a move after time ti + dti, 1 − G(φj(ti + dti)), multiplied by the marginal payoff
gain, L1(t
i− τ i, τ i) dti, with the corresponding expected marginal cost, which is equal to the
probability that player j makes a move during [ti, ti + dti], G˙(φj(ti))φ˙j(ti) dti, multiplied by
the foregone payoff, L(ti − τ i, τ i). In equilibrium, this first-order condition must hold for
τ i = φi(ti), leading to the following system of ODEs:
φ˙j(t) =
1−G
G˙
(φj(t))
L1
L
(t− φi(t), φi(t)), t ≥ σ(0), i = a, b. (4)
By construction, φa(σ(0)) = φb(σ(0)) = 0. Together with (4), this common initial condition
rules out asymmetric equilibria.
Lemma 3 Every equilibrium is symmetric.
Consider accordingly a symmetric equilibrium with common strategy σ and let φ ≡ σ−1.
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The system (4) then reduces to the ODE
φ˙(t) = f(t, φ(t)), t ≥ σ(0), (5)
where, by definition,
f(t, τ) ≡ 1−G
G˙
(τ)
L1
L
(t− τ, τ), t > τ. (6)
Three observations are worth making at this stage of the analysis. First, (5) holds for all
t larger than σ(0), which is endogenous. In turn, by Lemma 1(i), σ(0) must be such that
φ stays in the domain D ≡ {(t, τ) : 0 ≤ τ < t ≤ τ + M(τ)}. This global boundary
condition is a novel feature of our model.17 Second, by Assumption 1, limt↓τ {f(t, τ)} = ∞
and limt↑τ+M(τ) {f(t, τ)} = 0 for all τ ≥ 0, so that the vector field induced by (6) is outward-
pointing at the upper and lower boundaries τ = t and τ +M(τ) = t of D. This reinforces
our first observation that the choice of σ(0) is key to ensure that φ stays in D. Third, a
maturation delay t − φ(t) equal to the stand-alone maturation delay M(φ(t)) cannot arise
in equilibrium because, according to our second observation, this would cause φ to leave D
through its lower boundary at time t. Thus φ must stay in the interior of D, reflecting that
preemption risk is never eliminated. These properties are illustrated in Figure 1.
-
6
t
τ
t = τ
t = τ +M(τ)
D
6
µ
6
µ
-
µ
-
µ
φ(t) = τ
σ(0)
Figure 1 The domain D and the vector field induced by (6).
It remains to check the second-order conditions for optimality.
17If breakthroughs must occur before some common knowledge time T , types close to T face extreme
preemption risk and their equilibrium maturation delays must converge to zero. See Lambrecht and Perraudin
(2003), Arozamena and Cantillon (2004), and Anderson, Friedman, and Oprea (2010) for related boundary
conditions in real-option and auction contexts.
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Lemma 4 Let φ be a solution to (5) that stays in D and let σ ≡ φ−1. Then (σ, σ) is an
equilibrium.
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We are now ready to state the first central result of this section.
Theorem 1 An equilibrium exists.
The logic of Theorem 1 is as follows. By Lemmas 1–4, an equilibrium exists if and only
if, for some σ0 ∈ [0,M(0)], the solution to (5) with initial condition (σ0, 0) stays in D. Now,
if this were not so, all the solutions to (5), indexed by their initial conditions, would leave D.
Because the vector field induced by (6) is continuous, we would thereby obtain a continuous
mapping from [0,M(0)] onto the space consisting of the lower and upper boundaries of D.
This, however, is impossible, as the former space is connected, whereas the latter has two
connected components.18 Hence an equilibrium must exist.
This argument is nonconstructive and does not ensure that a unique equilibrium exists.
A priori, multiple initial conditions may be consistent with equilibrium because there is
no obvious terminal condition to pin down the behavior of players with late breakthrough
times. Moreover, intuitively, if player i decided to uniformly increase her moving time, the
value of waiting for player j should also increase. Given these strategic complementarities, it
would be natural to expect multiple equilibria to arise in our model. It may thus come as a
surprise that, under relatively mild conditions, a unique equilibrium exists. To formulate our
uniqueness result, we impose two further restrictions on the payoff functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0}.
The first restriction is that stand-alone maturation delays do not diverge to infinity.
Assumption 3 lim infτ→∞ {M(τ)} <∞.
The second restriction is that the functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0} uniformly satisfy a stronger
concavity property than log-concavity. Formally, recall from Avriel (1972) or Caplin and
Nalebuff (1991) that a nonnegative real-valued function h defined over an interval I ⊂ R is
ρ-concave for some ρ > 0 if h(λx + (1− λ)y) ≥ [λh(x)ρ + (1− λ)h(y)ρ]1/ρ for all (λ, x, y) ∈
[0, 1] × I × I. By Ho¨lder’s inequality, a higher value of ρ corresponds to a stronger notion
of concavity: for instance, if ρ = 1, h is concave, whereas in the limiting case ρ = 0, h is
log-concave. Our second restriction can then be stated as follows.
Assumption 4 There exists ρ > 0 such that, for each τ, L(·, τ) is ρ-concave over [0,M(τ)].
Under these additional assumptions, the following result holds.
18The proof of Theorem 1 is reminiscent of the retraction principle of Waz˙ewski (1947), see also Hartman
(1964, Chapter X, Theorem 2.1). For related existence theorems for antifunnels, see Hubbard and West
(1991, Theorem 4.7.3). An important difference, however, is that the function f in (6) does not satisfy a
global Lipschitz condition over D, so that a specific argument is needed.
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Theorem 2 The equilibrium is unique.
Thus our model exhibits saddle-path stability: there exists a unique trajectory of (5) that
stays in D, a requirement that plays an analogous role in our model as the transversality
condition in the Ramsey growth model. The intuition for this result is that two solutions
to (5) with different initial conditions are not only ordered but also tend to drift apart from
each other. Indeed, because the functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0} are uniformly log-concave, if
there are two equilibria with strategies σ1 > σ2, then the marginal gain L1/L from slightly
delaying one’s move relative to the loss if she is preempted is higher under σ1 than under
σ2. As a result, σ˙1 > σ˙2: the less a player feels threatened by preemption, the more she is
willing to wait at the margin. Assumption 4 yields a lower bound on the rate at which σ1
drifts apart from σ2, namely,
σ1(τ)− σ2(τ) ≥ [σ1(0)− σ2(0)] exp
(
ρ
∫ τ
0
G˙
1−G (θ) dθ
)
for all τ . As ρ > 0, the right-hand side of this inequality diverges to infinity because the
breakthrough rate G˙/(1 − G) is not integrable over [0,∞), although it may tend to zero
at infinity.19 Thus even arbitrarily small differences in initial maturation delays eventually
translate into arbitrarily large differences in maturation delays. This, under Assumption 3,
is inconsistent with the fact that players’ equilibrium maturation delays cannot exceed their
stand-alone maturation delays. Hence the equilibrium must be unique.20
Key to this reasoning is the minimal rationality requirement that players should never
wait in equilibrium more than in the absence of competition. Imposing this requirement
for increasing values of the breakthrough time narrows down the set of possible equilibrium
trajectories. Asymptotically, this funneling effect pins down a unique equilibrium. The role
of dominance considerations in this mechanism might be thought of in analogy with the
global-game literature.21
4 Economic Implications
In this section, we study how the strength of competition and the characteristics of research
projects affect the length of maturation delays and the quality of innovations.
4.1 Maturation Delays
4.1.1 Dynamic Analysis
A useful benchmark for our analysis is the stationary single-race model of Hopenhayn and
19Observe that ρ can be small as one wishes as long as it remains positive. This line of argument builds
on uniqueness results for antifunnels (Hubbard and West (1991)).
20We argue in Appendix C that the equilibrium is likely to be unique in a much wider set of circumstances
than those delineated by Assumptions 3–4.
21See, for instance, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) or Morris and Shin (2003).
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Squintani (2014), in which the players’ payoffs do not depend on their breakthrough times
and the latter are exponentially distributed with parameter λ > 0. The ODE (5) then writes
as φ˙(t) = (1/λ)(L˙/L)(t− φ(t)), the only solution of which that stays in D is φλ(t) ≡ t−Mλ
for a constant maturation delay Mλ ≡ (L˙/L)−1(λ). Intuitively, if player j selects the same
maturation delay regardless of her breakthrough time, she makes a move at rate λ. By
waiting herself an amount of time Mλ before making a move, player j balances the marginal
payoff gain from an infinitesimal additional delay dt, L˙(Mλ) dt, with the corresponding
expected marginal cost, which is equal to the probability that player j makes a move in
the next instant conditional on not having doing so before, λ dt, multiplied by the foregone
payoff, L(Mλ). This unique equilibrium exhibits no time dependence.
Yet, in practice, research hardly takes place in such a stationary environment (Stephan
(1996)). Indeed, human-capital accumulation and technological progress constantly modify
the research environment, making researchers more innovative, that is, more likely to have
breakthroughs, and also more efficient, that is, more able at developing their breakthroughs.
Such knowledge spillovers are pervasive in science and innovation: advances in a given field
spread to sometimes distant fields on which they shed a new light, enabling researchers or
inventors to make progress there as well.
To assess the impact of such factors on the evolution of equilibrium maturation delays
µ(τ) ≡ σ(τ)− τ , we invert (5) to get
µ˙(τ) =
G˙
1−G (τ)
L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)− 1. (7)
The constant 1 in (7) reflects that if the moving time did not change as a function of the
breakthrough time, a unit increase in the latter would mechanically decrease the maturation
delay by one. We see from (7) the two forces driving the evolution of the maturation delay.
The first one is the breakthrough rate G˙/(1 − G): if it increases over time, each player
anticipates her opponent to become more innovative, implying higher preemption risk and
thus lower incentives for her to wait before making a move. The second one is the growth
potential L1/L:
22 if it increases over time, that is, if (L1/L)2 > 0, then players with late
breakthroughs are more willing to wait and incur preemption risk than players with early
breakthroughs. The following result holds.
Proposition 1 If the mapping
τ 7→ G˙
1−G (τ)
L
L1
(m, τ)− 1 (8)
has a positive (negative) derivative over Tm ≡ {τ : m < M(τ)} for all m > 0, then µ(τ) is
strictly decreasing (increasing) in τ .
The logic of Proposition 1 relies on the following equilibrium argument. One may at
first glance expect from (7) that a positive derivative for (8) induces moving times to grow
22Note that this is the reciprocal of Aumann and Kurz’s (1977) fear-of-ruin index for utilities of wealth.
15
at an increasing rate, and thus maturation delays to increase. This, however, overlooks
the equilibrium requirement that players should never wait more in equilibrium than in the
absence of competition. Indeed, what a positive derivative for (8) actually implies is that,
if maturation delays were to start increasing, then they would do so at an increasing speed,
eventually exceeding stand-alone maturation delays. As this is inconsistent with equilibrium,
maturation delays must decrease.23
According to Proposition 1, an increasing growth potential mitigates the negative impact
on maturation delays of an increasing breakthrough rate. By contrast, this negative impact is
reinforced if the growth potential decreases over time.24 Thus, if players become increasingly
innovative, equilibrium maturation delays increase only if so does the growth potential of
breakthroughs. It is instructive to revisit Example 1 in the light of this insight.
Example 1 If the publication-delay function satisfies D12 > 0, additional maturation time
decreases more publication delays for early than for late breakthroughs. A reason why this
may happen is that, through improving refereeing and editorial standards, the publication
process becomes a better substitute to the amount of time researchers spend developing their
breakthroughs. If, besides, D2 < 0, then total time from breakthrough to publication at the
stand-alone maturation delay, M(τ) + D(M(τ), τ), is decreasing in τ . However, D12 > 0
implies that (L1/L)2 < 0; therefore, according to Proposition 1, equilibrium maturation
delays decrease if researchers become increasingly innovative: a more efficient publication
process reinforces their fear of preemption. In equilibrium, the impact on total time from
breakthrough to publication, µ(τ)+D(µ(τ), τ), is a priori ambiguous. We show in Appendix
B.1 that, if the breakthrough rate increases enough, the equilibrium maturation delay may
decrease so much that, as a result of the lowering elaboration of submissions, total time from
breakthrough to publication tends to increase. In the patent interpretation, (L1/L)2 < 0
if (ln pi)12 < 0, that is, if, in terms of allowance rate, the relative returns to increasing
the maturation delay are decreasing over time. This may happen because the patent office
becomes better at screening applications based on their intrinsic merit. Then, if inventors
become increasingly innovative, they wait less in equilibrium before applying for a patent.
The elaboration of applications may decrease so much as to make patent applications less
likely to succeed over time. Note that this effect takes place not in spite of, but because of the
research community (the pool of inventors) and the publication process (the patent office)
becoming more efficient over time. These results indicate a possible alternative interpretation
of the slowdown in the publication process documented by Ellison (2002) for top economics
journals over the period 1970–2000, and of the finding by Card and DellaVigna (2013) that
23The usual Lyapunov method would consist in working with the state (σ, τ) and in checking the sign over
{(m, τ) : 0 < m < M(τ)} of the scalar product of the gradient of the maturation delay relative to the state,
(1,−1), and of the law of motion of the state, (G˙L/[(1−G)L1], 1). However, for each τ , (L/L1)(m, τ) varies
from zero to infinity as m varies from zero to M(τ), making this method inconclusive. Our approach, by
contrast, focuses, not on the sign of this scalar product, but on how it varies with τ .
24Both scenarios are consistent with Assumption 2, which only states that (L1/L)1 < (L1/L)2 and thus
imposes no a priori restriction on the sign of (L1/L)2 as (L1/L)1 < 0 by Assumption 4.
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in recent years the number of submissions to these journals has dramatically increased while
their acceptance rates has decreased. These results also suggest that enhancing the efficiency
of the editorial process may counterproductively increase publication delays.
4.1.2 Comparative Statics
Our comparative-statics results rely on two partial orders over the sets of breakthrough
distributions and of payoff functions that are directly motivated by (7).
First, let G and G be two breakthrough distributions with densities G˙ and G˙. By analogy
with the first-price-auction literature (Lebrun (1998), Maskin and Riley (2000), Arozamena
and Cantillon (2004)), let G dominate G in the breakthrough-rate order if
G˙
1−G >
G˙
1−G (9)
over (0,∞), so that, in particular, G first-order stochastically dominates G: breakthroughs
tend to occur later under G than under G.
Next, let L and L be two payoff functions satisfying Assumptions 1–4, with stand-alone
maturation-delay functions M and M . By analogy with the fear-of-ruin literature (Aumann
and Kurz (1977), Foncel and Treich (2005)), let L dominate L in the growth-rate order if
L1
L
>
L1
L
(10)
over {(m, τ) : 0 < m < M(τ)}, so that, in particular, M ≤ M :25 payoffs grow with
maturation delays at a higher rate under L than under L.
Then the following comparative-statics result holds.
Proposition 2 Let µ (µ) be the equilibrium maturation delay under the distribution G (G)
or the payoff function L (L). Then, if G dominates G in the breakthrough-rate order, or if
L dominates L in the growth-rate order, then µ(τ) > µ(τ) for all τ .
Proposition 2 reflects the tension in our model between the risk of preemption and the
fear of preemption. When players are more innovative, preemption risk is higher because
breakthroughs occur more often, which speeds up the maturation process. By contrast, when
players compete on research projects with a higher growth potential, the fear of preemption
is lower because the marginal gain from slightly delaying one’s move relative to the loss if
she is preempted is higher, which slows down the maturation process. We use Examples 1
and 2 to illustrate these effects.
Example 1 A first implication of Proposition 2 is that academic submissions or patent
applications are less elaborate when researchers or inventors are more innovative, leading to
longer publication delays or lower allowance rates. To illustrate the second half of Proposition
25Condition (10) does not imply that L uniformly generates higher payoffs than L. Indeed, as L(0, τ) =
L(0, τ) = 0 for all τ , one can have L(m, τ) < L(m, τ) for m close to zero, as in Example 1 below.
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2, fix the publication-delay function, but allow the discount rate to vary. When r < r, the
corresponding payoff functions L and L are related by L = L
r/r
, so that L dominates L in the
growth-rate order. Hence, in this example, when competition takes place between relatively
impatient researchers, such as assistant professors on a tenure track, maturation delays are
longer and initial submissions are more elaborate than when it takes place between relatively
patient researchers, who for instance already have tenure. This reflects that more impatient
researchers are more concerned by having their papers stuck in the publication process than
less impatient ones. To ensure faster publication, they are thus more willing to incur risk
by letting their breakthroughs mature more than the latter before submitting their work.
A similar conclusion can be drawn in the patent interpretation, where an inventor may be
more or less impatient due to more or less severe cash constraints.
Example 2 Proposition 2 allows one to study the impact of the shape of the reward
function and of the noise distribution on equilibrium maturation delays. To fix ideas, suppose
that S does not depend on the breakthrough time and is quadratic in journal ranking,
S(j) ≡ aj + bj2/2, and that J(m, ε) = mε for all m and ε.26 Then the growth potential
L˙
L
(m) = −r + 1 + (b/a){E[ε˜
2]/E[ε˜]}m
m+ (b/a){E[ε˜2]/E[ε˜]}m2/2
is increasing in b/a and E[ε˜2]/E[ε˜]. Concretely, a higher b/a ratio corresponds to a more
convex reward function S, putting relatively more weight on leading journals like “top five”
journals in Economics or “series A” journals in Physics. Such a reward function makes
researchers more willing to incur preemption risk, as the marginal gain from the perspective
of publishing in a higher-ranked journal, which on average requires more maturation, is higher
relative to the loss if one is preempted. This, according to Proposition 2, leads to longer
equilibrium maturation delays. A higher E[ε˜2]/E[ε˜] ratio has a similar impact. Intuitively,
this is because the convexity of the researchers’ reward function creates an option value of
waiting that is higher, the higher this ratio is.27
More Than Two Players The impact of increased competition is similar to that of an
increase in the breakthrough-rate order. Indeed, suppose there are N > 2 symmetric players
whose breakthrough times are independently drawn from the distribution G. In a symmetric
equilibrium with common strategy σ = φ−1, the problem faced by type τ i of player i is
max
ti∈[τ i,∞)
{∏
j 6=i
P[σ(τ˜ j) > ti]L(ti − τ i, τ i)
}
= max
ti∈[τ i,∞)
{[1−G(φ(ti))]N−1L(ti − τ i, τ i)},
26It is straightforward to check that Assumptions 1–4 hold for this example.
27An alternative interpretation of the above function J is that it describes the random output from
research. A short maturation delay then corresponds to a low-return, low-risk research strategy, while a
long maturation delay corresponds to high-return, high-risk research strategy. This echoes the tradeoff
emphasized by March (1991) between exploitation of already-existing ideas along conventional lines and
exploration of new ideas. A more convex function encourages the second type of research strategy, for
instance by rewarding long-term rather than short-term successes. Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Manso (2011)
provide evidence on the impact of different incentive schemes in academic life sciences.
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so that φ satisfies
φ˙(t) =
1
N − 1 f(t, φ(t)), t ≥ σ(0),
where f is given by (6). Increasing the number of players thus amounts to multiply the
breakthrough rate, which, by Proposition 2, leads to shorter maturation delays.28
The contrast between the prospection phase and the development phase highlighted in
Proposition 2 suggests that, if the quality of research outputs is a function of the amount of
time researchers spend developing their breakthroughs, they should be induced to engage in
projects with higher growth potential rather than in projects where breakthroughs are more
frequent. If the development technology varies over time, however, an explicit modeling of
quality is required, a task to which we now turn.
4.2 Innovation Quality
4.2.1 Technology, Maturation, and Quality
By the quality of an innovation, we mean its capacity to create value for those who use it or
consume it. In the context of our model, this can be thought of as the result of two factors.
One is the time τ at which a player has a breakthrough, which determines the technology
she will have at her disposal to develop it; the other is the amount of time m she devotes to
this task. We denote by Q(m, τ) the resulting quality level.29
Assumption 5 The function Q is continuous over [0,∞)× [0,∞) and thrice continuously
differentiable over (0,∞)× (0,∞). For all m and τ,
Q(0, τ) = 0 and Q1(m, τ) > 0.
Moreover, for all m > 0 and τ ≥ 0,
Q2(m, τ) > 0 and lim
τ→∞
{Q(m, τ)} <∞.
Thus, in terms of quality, the returns to maturation and to technology are positive. A
later breakthrough allows a player to save on the maturation time required to achieve any
given quality level, reflecting that she can build on an increasing body of knowledge to
develop her breakthrough.
We next restrict the cross effects of maturation delays and breakthrough times on quality.
28Formally, each player behaves as if she were facing a single opponent with breakthrough time drawn
from the distribution G(1/N−1) ≡ 1−(1−G)N−1 of the first-order statistic for a sample of N−1 independent
breakthrough times drawn from G.
29In practice, quality is not directly observable, but must rather be inferred from multiple characteristics
of innovations. For instance, in the case of patents, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) construct a composite
index of patent quality using as indicators the number of claims, forward citations to the patent, backward
citations in the patent application, and family size.
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Assumption 6 For all m and τ,
Q11(m, τ) ≤ Q12(m, τ).
Equivalently, the mapping (t, τ) 7→ Q(t − τ, τ) is supermodular: in terms of quality,
the returns to increasing the moving time t are increasing in the breakthrough time τ . It
is useful to interpret this form of complementarity in light of the maturation-technology
wedge (Q1 − Q2)(m, τ) between the returns to maturation and the returns to technology.
This quantity represents the (possibly negative) difference in the qualities of the innovations
achieved by a type-τ player and a type-τ + dτ player when they both make a move at time
t = m+ τ , so that the former benefits from a longer maturation delay and the latter from a
better development technology.30 Assumption 6 states that this quality differential decreases
in m, reflecting that the type-τ + dτ player can exploit her technological advantage over a
longer period of time.
4.2.2 Dynamic Analysis
To assess how quality χ(τ) ≡ Q(µ(τ), τ) evolves in equilibrium, we change variables and
directly work in terms of quality. The maturation delay T (q, τ) − τ required to deliver an
innovation of quality q given a breakthrough time τ is implicitly defined by
Q(T (q, τ)− τ, τ) = q. (11)
To develop the analogy with the evolution of maturation delays, it is helpful to take advantage
of (11) to redefine the players’ payoff as a function of q and τ , which leads to
H(q, τ) ≡ L(T (q, τ)− τ, τ). (12)
The following assumption parallels Assumption 4.
Assumption 7 There exists ρ > 0 such that, for each τ, H(·, τ) is ρ-concave over [0,
Q(M(τ), τ)].
Using the identity µ(τ) = T (χ(τ), τ)− τ along with (7) and (12) yields an ODE for the
evolution of equilibrium quality,
χ˙(τ) =
G˙
1−G (τ)
H
H1
(χ(τ), τ)− T2
T1
(χ(τ), τ). (13)
By analogy with (7), the first term on the right-hand side of (13) reflects preemption risk,
measured by the breakthrough rate G˙/(1 − G), and growth potential, measured by H1/H
in quality units. In line with the logic of Proposition 1, when the ratio of these two terms
30Indeed, one has Q(m, τ)−Q(m−dτ, τ+dτ) = (Q1−Q2)(m, τ) dτ+o(dτ). The quantity (Q1−Q2)(m, τ)
is economically meaningful because the factors m and τ are measured in the same time units.
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increases with the breakthrough time, this tends, other things equal, to make quality fall
over time.
A possibly countervailing factor, however, comes from the second term on the right-
hand side of (13), which, unlike the corresponding constant 1 in (7), can be affected by the
passage of time. To interpret this term, notice that, just as 1 trivially measures by how
much a player must decrease her maturation delay when her breakthrough time increases
by one unit, so as to keep the same moving time, T2/T1 measures by how much the quality
of her innovation decreases when her breakthrough time increases by one unit, subject to
the same constraint. That is, for a given pair (q0, τ0) and a fixed moving time T (q0, τ0),
(T2/T1)(q0, τ0) dτ represents how many quality units a player would have produced on top
of q0, had she had her breakthrough at τ0 − dτ instead of τ0.
For a given quality level q0, variations of the marginal rate of substitution (T2/T1)(q0, τ0)
with respect to the breakthrough time τ0 reflect how changes in technology affect how fast
innovations are developed.31 For instance, if (T2/T1)2 > 0, technological progress makes
additional maturation delay become increasingly productive, which tends, other things equal,
to make quality increase over time.
To determine which assumptions on Q guarantee that (T2/T1)2 > 0, note from (11) that
T2/T1 is linked to the maturation-technology wedge by
T2
T1
(q, τ) = (Q1 −Q2)(T (q, τ)− τ, τ). (14)
Under Assumption 5, the maturation delay T (q, τ)− τ required to achieve an innovation of
quality q decreases in the breakthrough time τ ; this, under Assumption 6, tends to increase
(T2/T1)(q, τ) as the maturation-technology wedge (Q1 −Q2)(m, τ) is then decreasing in the
maturation delay m. A sufficient condition for (T2/T1)2 > 0 is thus that Q12 > Q22. This
holds whenever the difference in the qualities of the innovations achieved by a type-τ player
and a type-τ + dτ player when they both make a move at time t = m+ τ increases with τ ,
reflecting that the technological advantage of the type-τ + dτ player decreases over time.
The following result parallels Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 If the mapping
τ 7→ G˙
1−G (τ)
H
H1
(q, τ)− T2
T1
(q, τ) (15)
has a positive (negative) derivative over Tq ≡ {τ : q < Q(M(τ), τ)} for all q > 0, then χ(τ)
is strictly decreasing (increasing) in τ .
4.2.3 Comparative Statics
As a starting point, it is helpful to observe that, if researchers become more innovative,
31To use a mechanical analogy, (T2/T1)(q0, τ0) represents the speed at which small additional delays are
converted into quality along the isochrone curve T (q, τ) = T (q0, τ0), so that variations of (T2/T1)(q0, τ0)
with respect to τ0 can be interpreted as an acceleration.
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the quality of innovations unambiguously deteriorates. Indeed, we know from Proposition 2
that, if G dominates G in the breakthrough-rate order, then equilibrium maturation delays
are uniformly longer under G than under G; under Assumption 5, innovation-quality levels
are then uniformly higher under G than under G. The key here is that the development
technology is held fixed while the intensity of competition is varied.
But what about a change in the development technology itself? To address this question,
we specify Example 3 using a parametric model of quality, inspired by the innovation-and-
growth literature, in which researchers may operate away from the technological frontier.32
Example 3 The technological frontier is represented by a function ξ : [0,∞) → [0,∞);
for each s, ξ(s) is the speed at which the quality of an innovation increases at time s when
the frontier technology is used to develop it. The distance to the frontier is measured by a
parameter d ∈ [0, 1]; 1−d is the fraction of increases in ξ that are assimilated by a researcher
after having a breakthrough.33 Then quality is given by
Q(m, τ ; d) ≡ ξ(τ)m+ (1− d)
∫ τ+m
τ
[ξ(s)− ξ(τ)] ds (16)
and payoffs are given by
L(m, τ ; d) ≡ exp(−rm)P (Q(m, τ ; d)). (17)
Assumptions 5–6 are satisfied if ξ is bounded, with ξ > 0 and ξ˙ > 0.34 If d = 0, a researcher,
no matter when she had a breakthrough, can use at any point in time the frontier technology
to develop it. By contrast, if d = 1, a researcher with a time-τ breakthrough is locked in with
the time-τ technology. For intermediate values of d, a researcher benefits to some extent from
ongoing technological progress while developing her breakthrough, but cannot catch up with
the most recent advances. The maturation-technology wedge ξ(τ)− dξ˙(τ)m is decreasing in
the distance d to the frontier: the less a researcher can assimilate new technological advances
after having a breakthrough, the larger the technological advantage enjoyed by a type-τ+dτ
player over a type-τ player.
To study the impact on innovation quality of a change in the distance to the frontier, it
is first tempting to exploit our results on equilibrium maturation delays, using the ODE (7).
From (17), we have
L1
L
(m, τ ; d) = −r + Q1
Q
(m, τ ; d) ²P (Q(m, τ ; d)), (18)
where ²P is the elasticity of consumers’ inverse demand function for quality.
32See Aghion and Howitt (2005) for a survey of this literature.
33To use Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) terminology, 1− d is the “absorptive capacity” of a researcher.
34Detailed calculations for this example are gathered in Appendix B.2. We provide there conditions on the
functions ξ and P that ensure that Assumptions 1–7 are satisfied. These conditions state that technological
progress is not too drastic and that the inverse demand for innovation quality becomes sufficiently insensitive
to quality increases, the higher quality is.
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It is easy to check that the qualityQ(m, τ ; d) and the sensitivity (Q1/Q)(m, τ ; d) of quality
to maturation are decreasing in the distance d to the frontier. Therefore, if the elasticity
²P (q) is increasing in quality q, we get that L(·, · ; d) decreases with d in the growth-rate order.
Then, according to Proposition 2, a lower distance to the frontier leads to an equilibrium
with longer maturation delays and, therefore, higher quality levels. This is for instance the
case if P is sufficiently convex, that is, if the benefit of a quality increment increases fast
enough with quality. Then, when inventors become closer to the technological frontier, they
have an incentive to develop their breakthroughs even more.
However, a more natural assumption is that the elasticity ²P (q) is decreasing in quality
q, which requires P to be sufficiently concave. Then it need no longer be the case that
L(·, · ; d) decreases with d in the growth-rate order, and Proposition 2 no longer applies:
depending on the inverse demand for quality, being closer to the frontier may lead to longer
or shorter maturation delays in equilibrium.35 The intuition is that, as the marginal returns
are decreasing, inventors may prefer to let their breakthroughs mature less, despite the
development technology being more efficient.
We shall instead directly reason in terms of quality, using the ODE (13). The distance
to the frontier affects the evolution of quality both through the marginal rate of substitution
of breakthrough time for quality, T2/T1, and through the growth potential of breakthrough
measured in quality units, H1/H. As for T2/T1, (14) yields, in the current specification,
T2
T1
(q, τ ; d) = ξ(τ)− dξ˙(τ)[T (q, τ ; d)− τ ],
which is decreasing in d because the maturation delay required to achieve an innovation of
quality q, T (q, τ ; d)− τ , is increasing in d, a force that tends to reduce quality. The behavior
of H1/H is less clear-cut. Indeed, from (12) and (17), we have
H1
H
(q, τ ; d) = −rT1(q, τ ; d) + P
′
P
(q),
which varies with d inversely to the increase in maturation delay required to produce an
additional unit of quality, T1(q, τ ; d) − 1. When the technological frontier ξ increases at a
decreasing rate, the latter is strictly increasing in d, which reduces the growth potential of
breakthroughs and further contributes to reduce quality. Hence the following result.
Proposition 4 If ξ¨ < 0 and d > d, then χ(τ ; d) > χ(τ ; d) for all τ .
Intuitively, when the distance to the frontier decreases, technology becomes more labor
enhancing. This mitigates the impact of preemption risk and reduces the sensitivity of
quality to competition. This result complements the endogenous-growth literature, according
to which product-market competition should be more growth enhancing for firms that are
closer to the technological frontier.36 In our model, higher breakthrough rates always have a
35That the latter scenario is not only a theoretical possibility is illustrated in Appendix B.2.2.
36See Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001), and Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005).
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Schumpeterian effect: they intensify the race for priority, leading inventors to prematurely
apply for patents. Proposition 4 shows that the resulting negative effect on innovation quality
is less pronounced, the lower the distance to the technological frontier.
5 Asymmetric Priority Races
In this section, we study the impact of asymmetries between players. To keep the analysis
tractable, we simplify the model by assuming that players’ payoffs do not directly depend on
their breakthrough times; that is, we abstract from changes in the technology affecting the
development of breakthroughs. This implies that the quality of a research output is only a
function of the time spent maturing it.
5.1 The Hare and the Tortoise
Suppose first that players have constant but different breakthrough rates λa > λb: a, the
hare, is a relatively more innovative researcher than b, the tortoise. The game otherwise
remains the same as in Section 2, the only difference being that τ˜a and τ˜ b now have different
distributions. The payoff L(m, τ) ≡ L(m) is independent of τ and we let M be the point
at which it reaches its maximum. In an equilibrium with continuous strategies (σa, σb),
φa ≡ (σa)−1 and φb ≡ (σb)−1 solve the following system of ODEs:37
φ˙j(t) =
1
λj
L˙
L
(t− φi(t)), t ≥ σ(0), i = a, b. (19)
As in the symmetric case, the initial condition σ(0) = σa(0) = σb(0) of that system must be
chosen in such a way that neither φa nor φb leave D. Letting µi(τ) ≡ σi(τ)− τ be player i’s
equilibrium maturation delay, we can now state the central result of this section.
Theorem 3 There exists a unique continuous equilibrium. In this equilibrium, µa(τ) (µb(τ))
is strictly increasing (decreasing) in τ . In particular, µa(τ˜a) > µb(τ˜ b) unless τ˜a = τ˜ b = 0.
A key insight of Theorem 3 is that the hare always lets her breakthroughs mature more
than the tortoise, no matter when their respective breakthroughs occur: echoing a theme
in March (1991), more innovative researchers endogenously behave more ambitiously in the
exploration of new ideas and thus succeed or fail more spectacularly than less innovative ones.
This leads to the prediction that, within a group of competing researchers with different
innovative abilities, speed of discovery and quality of research output should be positively
correlated.38 In our model, this effect only arises because of competition between researchers.
37As explained in Appendix A, Lemma 1 carries over to this asymmetric context. Our proof of Lemma
2(i), however, does not extend to the case of asymmetric players, so that we have to postulate continuity.
38Note, however, that, according to Proposition 2, this correlation would be reversed if it were computed
across noncompeting groups of homogenous researchers: indeed, groups with more innovative researchers
are more competitive, leading to shorter maturation delays and lower-quality research outputs.
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Indeed, if they were not threatened by preemption, all researchers would adopt the same
maturation delayM , leading to identical high-quality research outputs. A further implication
of Theorem 3 is that, if a breakthrough occurs early on, the resulting maturation delay is
less sensitive to the identity of the player who has it than if it occurs later on. Thus later
breakthroughs result in higher heterogeneity in the quality of research outputs: over time,
the hare experiences a flight to quality, contrary to the tortoise.
We now study how the equilibrium reacts to changes in breakthrough rates. Consider
an increase in the hare’s breakthrough rate, holding the tortoise’s constant. The direct
effect of such an increase can be seen upon writing (19) for i = b: if the hare’s behavior
as summarized by φ˙a(t) is held fixed, an increase in λa triggers a downward shift of the
tortoise’s maturation delay t− φb(t). Of course, things are complicated by the fact that the
hare’s behavior also varies when her own breakthrough rate increases. Yet, the following
result shows that facing a more challenging opponent unambiguously makes the tortoise
more cautious, thereby deteriorating the quality of her research output.
Proposition 5 Let µi (µi) be player i’s equilibrium maturation delay when the hare’s
breakthrough rate is λa (λa) and the tortoise’s breakthrough rate is λb. Then, if λa > λa,
µb(τ) < µb(τ) for all τ .
As for the hare, an increase in her breakthrough rate is a mixed blessing. More frequent
breakthroughs increase her competitive edge and, other things equal, allow her to take more
time to let them mature. However, by Proposition 5, the tortoise reacts to an increase in the
hare’s breakthrough rate by letting her own breakthroughs mature even less, which makes
her a tougher opponent. Which of these effects dominates is a priori unclear and depends
on when the hare has her breakthrough. If this occurs early on, which is more likely as she
has become more innovative, the second, strategic effect dominates because one must have
σa(0) = σb(0) in equilibrium. Players are thus caught in a vicious circle: the fact that the
tortoise behaves more cautiously in equilibrium compels the hare to do the same when she
has an early breakthrough.39
Asymmetric breakthrough rates may reflect innate ability differences between researchers,
or specialization. In that respect, the results of this section shed some light on the findings
of Borjas and Doran (2012) on the post-1992 influx of highly-skilled Soviet mathematicians
on the scientific production of US mathematicians. These authors not only document a
large drop in the publication rate of US mathematicians whose research agenda overlapped
most with Soviet mathematicians—a crowding-out effect that could simply reflect increased
competition for scarce journal space—but they also show that the quality of their papers, as
measured by the number of citations they generated or their likelihood of becoming “home
runs,” significantly fell as well. This second effect is consistent with our finding that, when
39Unlike in Proposition 5, however, one cannot translate this local insight into a global comparative-statics
result. We show in Appendix B.3 that, depending on the parameters of the model, for late breakthrough
times, an increase in the hare’s breakthrough rate may increase or decrease her equilibrium maturation delay.
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she faces a hare, a tortoise lets her breakthroughs mature less than if she were facing an
opponent of equal strength, and the less so, the more innovative the hare is. Thus one may
interpret the drop in quality documented by Borjas and Doran (2012) as resulting from US
mathematicians adopting a more cautious research strategy for fear of being preempted by
their more talented Soviet opponents.
When competitors are research labs or firms instead of individuals, an advantage in
innovative ability may typically result from better funding, higher interdisciplinarity, stronger
leadership, and other organizational features.40 The amount of R&D, for instance, has been
found to rise in a roughly proportional way with firm size.41 One may thus postulate that, in
a mechanical way, the breakthrough rate varies monotonically with firm size. Interestingly,
however, it is also typically found in the data that the number of patents and innovations per
dollar of R&D tends to decline with firm size or the amount of R&D. Although Proposition
5 does not directly speak to this issue, it suggests a new mechanism, whereby a firm having
higher R&D expenditures tends to make its competitors more cautious; this, in turn, reduces
its own R&D productivity, when the latter is measured, not by the ratio of patents to R&D,
but, rather, by the ratio of their quality to R&D.
5.2 The Ant and the Grasshopper
Other respects in which players may differ are the type of research projects they undertake,
how able they are at developing them, or the incentives they face. Suppose accordingly that
players have a constant common breakthrough rate λ but different payoff functions La and
Lb such that La dominates Lb in the growth-rate order: a, the ant, works on a project with
higher growth potential than b, the grasshopper. As pointed out in Section 4.1.2, in the case
of academic competition, the higher standards of a may reflect that, unlike b, she does not
have tenure yet, or that she belongs to an institution with a steeper incentive scheme. The
payoffs La(m, τ) ≡ La(m) and Lb(m, τ) ≡ Lb(m) are independent of τ and are assumed to
reach their maximum at the same point M .42 In an equilibrium with continuous strategies
(σa, σb), φa ≡ (σa)−1 and φb ≡ (σb)−1 solve the following system of ODEs:
φ˙j(t) =
1
λ
L˙i(t− φi(t))
Li(t− φi(t)) , t ≥ σ(0), i = a, b. (20)
By analogy with Theorem 3, there exists a unique continuous equilibrium, in which the ant
always lets her breakthroughs mature more than the grasshopper, no matter when their
respective breakthroughs occur. Unlike in the case of the hare and the tortoise, however,
the ant tends to behave more cautiously, and the grasshopper less cautiously, than if they
were each facing an opponent with similar payoff function. Indeed, being confronted to an
40See, in the case of medical science, Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth (2000).
41See Cohen and Klepper (1996) and Cohen (2010) for discussions of the relevant empirical evidence.
42This holds, for instance, if Lb = h◦La for some differentiable and strictly increasing function h : [0,∞)→
[0,∞) such that h(0) = 0 and h(l)/l is strictly decreasing in l (Foncel and Treich (2005, Proposition 1)).
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ant inclines a grasshopper to let her breakthroughs mature more, and thus has a positive
impact on the quality of her research output because facing a less hasty competitor with
higher standards than her owns reduces the competitive pressure she is exposed to.
The following result parallels Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 Let µi (µi) be player i’s equilibrium maturation delay when the ant’s payoff
function is La (La) and the grasshopper’s payoff function is Lb. Then, if La dominates La
in the growth-rate order, µa(τ) > µa(τ) for all τ .
Hence an increase in the growth potential of the ant’s breakthroughs leads her to let her
breakthrough mature even more. This, in turn, induces the grasshopper to do the same, at
least when she has an early breakthrough. In line with the examples discussed in Section
4.1.2, this positive contagion effect suggests that the high standards set by, or imposed
upon, young researchers eager to get tenure may have a positive externality on the academic
profession as a whole. Similarly, incentive schemes rewarding long-term rather than short-
term successes, such as the ERC in Europe or the HHMI in the US (Azoulay, Graff Griffin,
and Manso (2011)) mitigate the impact of preemption risk, even for researchers who do not
directly benefit from them.
6 Concluding Remarks
We would like to close this paper with two final observations.
The first pertains to the implication of our analysis for empirical work on R&D. A
key ingredient of our model is the researchers’ breakthrough rate, which measures their
raw innovative ability. This quantity and how it evolves over time are hard to measure
empirically. Indeed, what we observe in practice is not the fecundity of R&D itself, but
only the output of research, that is, for instance, the number of publications per scientist,
or the number of patents per dollar of R&D expenditure. This creates an identification
problem in interpreting changes in the patent to R&D ratio. An interesting implication of
our analysis is that the measurement of real changes in research productivity is made even
more complex by the race for priority. Indeed, the more innovative the research community
becomes, the faster scientists or inventors disclose their results or patent their innovations.
Hence an observed growth in the patent to R&D ratio may actually overstate the real
growth in research productivity, in contrast with the conclusions of empirical work that
has attempted to disentangle real from apparent changes in this variable (Lanjouw and
Schankerman (2004)).
The second is that, whereas we have focused throughout our analysis on winner-take-
all priority races, being preempted does not necessarily mean in practice that a researcher
should lose all the fruit of her work. For instance, Stephan (1996) notes that “A number
of institutional arrangements have evolved in science to help minimize risk or provide some
insurance against risk.” Notable examples of institutions that play this role are second-tier
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or field journals. If publications in these journals are taken into account in tenure or hiring
decisions, they act as a safety net by securing some rents to preempted researchers. This
in turn induces researchers to spend more time maturing their ideas, thereby increasing the
overall quality of the research published in first-tier journals.43 Yet an interesting tradeoff
is that this insurance mechanism may conflict with the positive impact of steep incentive
schemes on the maturation of ideas. The optimal design of rewards in a dynamic competitive
research environment is an important topic for future investigations.
43A formal analysis is provided in Appendix B.4.
28
Appendix A: Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Suppose first, by way of contradiction, that σi(τ i) = τ i for some
i and τ i. Then, according to (1), type τ i’s equilibrium payoff is zero. Yet, according to (1)
again, type τ i could secure a payoff {P[σj(τ˜ j) > τ i +m] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = τ i +m]}L(m, τ i)
by waiting an amount of time m > 0. As L(m, τ i) > 0 for all m > 0, this implies that
P[σj(τ˜ j) > τ i +m] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = τ i +m] = 0 and hence P[σj(τ˜ j) > τ i +m] = 0 for any
such m. As a result, one must have P[σj(τ˜ j) ≤ τ i] = 1, which is impossible as
P[σj(τ˜ j) ≤ τ i] =
∫ τ i
0
1{σj(τj)≤τ i} dG(τ
j) ≤ G(τ i) < 1. (21)
This contradiction establishes that σi(τ i)− τ i > 0 for all i and τ i.
Suppose next, by way of contradiction, that σi(τ i)−τ i > M(τ i) for some i and τ i. Then,
as L is strictly decreasing over [M(τ i),∞), one has, for each ε ∈ (0, σi(τ i)− τ i−M(τ i)] such
that P[σj(τ˜ j) = σi(τ i)− ε] = 0,
V i(σi(τ i), τ i, σj) = {P[σj(τ˜ j) > σi(τ i)] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = σi(τ i)]}L(σi(τ i)− τ i, τ i)
≤ P[σj(τ˜ j) ≥ σi(τ i)]L(σi(τ i)− τ i, τ i)
< P[σj(τ˜ j) ≥ σi(τ i)− ε]L(σi(τ i)− ε− τ i, τ i)
= {P[σj(τ˜ j) > σi(τ i)− ε] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = σi(τ i)− ε]}L(σi(τ i)− ε− τ i, τ i)
= V i(σi(τ i)− ε− τ i, τ i, σj),
which is ruled out by (2). This contradiction establishes that σi(τ i) − τ i ≤ M(τ i) for all i
and τ i. The result follows.
(ii) We first prove that σi is nondecreasing for all i, that is, that σi(τˆ i) ≥ σi(τ i) for all
τ i and τˆ i > τ i. By Lemma 1(i), the result is obvious if τˆ i ≥ σi(τ i) or σi(τˆ i) ≥ τ i +M(τ i).
Thus suppose that σi(τ i) > τˆ i and τ i +M(τ i) > σi(τˆ i). It follows from the first of these
inequalities that σi(τ i) is a feasible moving time for type τˆ i, just like σi(τˆ i) is a feasible
moving time for type τ i as σi(τˆ i) ≥ τˆ i > τ i. Hence, by (2),
V i(σi(τ i), τ i, σj) ≥ V i(σi(τˆ i), τ i, σj), (22)
V i(σi(τˆ i), τˆ i, σj) ≥ V i(σi(τ i), τˆ i, σj). (23)
Because σ(τ˜ j) ≥ τ˜ j and G has unbounded support, both P[σj(τ˜ j) > ti] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = ti]
and P[σj(τ˜ j) > tˆi] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = tˆi] are positive. Moreover, by assumption, σi(τ i) > τˆ i,
and, by Lemma 1(i), σi(τˆ i) > τˆ i, so that both L(σi(τ i) − τˆ i, τˆ i) and L(σi(τˆ i) − τˆ i, τˆ i) are
positive. Multiplying (22) by (23) and rearranging using (1) then yields
L(σi(τ i)− τ i, τ i)
L(σi(τ i)− τˆ i, τˆ i) ≥
L(σi(τˆ i)− τ i, τ i)
L(σi(τˆ i)− τˆ i, τˆ i) . (24)
By assumption and by Lemma 1(i), τˆ i < σi(τˆ i) < τ i +M(τ i) and τˆ i < σi(τ i) ≤ τ i +M(τ i).
Thus, according to (24), to establish that σi(τˆ i) ≥ σi(τ i), we only need to show that the
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mapping t 7→ L(t − τ i, τ i)/L(t − τˆ i, τˆ i) is strictly decreasing over (τˆ i, τ i +M(τ i)]. This in
turn holds if its derivative is strictly negative at all t in this interval, that is, if
(lnL)1(t− τ i, τ i)− (lnL)1(t− τˆ i, τˆ i) =
∫ τˆ i
τ i
[(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](t− τ, τ) dτ < 0
for any such t, which follows from Assumption 2, owing to the fact that t − τ ≤ M(τ) for
all τ ≥ τ i as t ≤ τ i +M(τ i). This establishes that σi is nondecreasing for all i.
Suppose next, by way of contradiction, that τˆ i > τ i and yet σi(τˆ i) = σi(τ i). Then σi is
constant over [τ i, τˆ i] and the distribution of player i’s equilibrium moving time has an atom
at σi(τ i). The following claim then holds.
Claim 1 There exists ε0 > 0 such that
σj(τ j) 6∈ (σi(τ i), σi(τ i) + ε0), τ j ∈ [0, σi(τ i)). (25)
(Observe that the interval [0, σi(τ i)) is nonempty as σi(τ i) ≥ σi(0) > 0 by Lemma 1(i)
along with the fact that σi is nondecreasing.) Suppose Claim 1 established. Then the only
types of player j who can make a move during (σi(τ i), σi(τ i) + ε0) are those such that
τ j ≥ σi(τ i). But it follows from Lemma 1(i) that σj(σi(τ i)) = σi(τ i) + ε1 for some ε1 > 0.
Hence, as σj is nondecreasing, player j never makes a move during (σi(τ i), σi(τ i) + ε0 ∧ ε1).
Because σi(τˆ i) = σi(τ i) ≤ τ i + M(τ i) < τˆ i + M(τˆ i) by Lemma 1(i), one has, letting
tˆi ≡ [σi(τ i) + (ε0 ∧ ε1)/2]∧ [τˆ i +M(τˆ i)] and using the fact that L(·, τˆ i) is strictly increasing
over [0,M(τˆ i)],
V i(σi(τˆ i), τˆ i, σj) = V i(σi(τ i), τˆ i, σj)
= {P[σj(τ˜ j) > σi(τ i)] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = σi(τ i)]}L(σi(τ i)− τˆ i, τˆ i)
≤ P[σj(τ˜ j) ≥ σi(τ i)]L(σi(τ i)− τˆ i, τˆ i)
< P[σj(τ˜ j) ≥ σi(τ i)]L(tˆi − τˆ i, τˆ i)
= {P[σj(τ˜ j) > tˆi] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = tˆi]}L(tˆi − τˆ i, τˆ i)
= V i(tˆi, τˆ i, σj),
which is ruled out by (2). This contradiction establishes that σi is strictly increasing for all
i. The result follows.
To complete the proof of Lemma 1(ii), it remains to prove Claim 1. If σj(σi(τ i)−) ≤
σi(τ i), (25) directly follows from the fact that σj is nondecreasing. Thus suppose that
σj(σi(τ i)−) = σi(τ i) + ε−1 for some ε−1 > 0. Then, as σj is nondecreasing, there exists
δ1 > 0 such that σ
j(τ j) > σi(τ i) + ε−1 /2 for all τ
j ≥ σi(τ i) − δ1. Consider now types
τ j < σi(τ i)− δ1. By Lemma 1(i), among these, we only need to be concerned by those such
that τ j ≥ [σi(τ i)−M(τ j)] ∨ 0. Thus let A ≡ {τ j : [σi(τ i)−M(τ j)] ∨ 0 ≤ τ j < σi(τ i)− δ1}
and assume that A is nonempty. Observe that, because τ j +M(τ j) is strictly increasing
in τ j, A is an interval. We now show that there exists some ε−0 > 0 such that any type
in A is strictly better off making a move before time σi(τ i) than making a move during
(σi(τ i), σi(τ i) + ε−0 ), from which Claim 1 follows for ε0 ≡ ε−0 ∧ (ε−1 /2). For any type τ j ∈ A,
making a move at time σi(τ i)− ε yields a payoff P[σi(τ˜ i) ≥ σi(τ i)− ε]L(σi(τ i)− ε− τ j, τ j)
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for all ε ∈ (0, σi(τ i) − τ j) such that P[σi(τ˜ i) = σi(τ i) − ε] = 0, whereas making a move at
time σi(τ i) + ε′ yields at most a payoff P[σi(τ˜ i) ≥ σi(τ i) + ε′]L(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j) for all
ε′ > 0. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
∀ ε−0 ∈ (0,∞) ∃ ε′ ∈ [0, ε−0 ] ∃ τ j ∈ A ∀ ε ∈ (0, σi(τ i)− τ j)
P[σi(τ˜ i) ≥ σi(τ i) + ε′]L(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j) ≥ P[σi(τ˜ i) ≥ σi(τ i)− ε]L(σi(τ i)− ε− τ j, τ j).
Then, a fortiori,
∀ ε−0 ∈ (0,∞) ∃ ε′ ∈ [0, ε−0 ] ∃ τ j ∈ A ∀ ε ∈ (0, σi(τ i)− τ j)
{P[σi(τ˜ i) ≥ σi(τ i)− ε]−P[σi(τ˜ i) = σi(τ i)]}L(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j)
≥ P[σi(τ˜ i) ≥ σi(τ i)− ε]L(σi(τ i)− ε− τ j, τ j),
so that, letting ε go to zero,
∀ ε−0 ∈ (0,∞) ∃ ε′ ∈ [0, ε−0 ] ∃ τ j ∈ A
P[σi(τ˜ i) ≥ σi(τ i)]
[
1− L(σ
i(τ i)− τ j, τ j)
L(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j)
]
≥ P[σi(τ˜ i) = σi(τ i)].
Because the distribution of player i’s equilibrium moving time has an atom at σi(τ i), this
implies that
inf
ε−0 ∈(0,∞)
sup
ε′∈[0,ε−0 ]
sup
τj∈A
{
1− L(σ
i(τ i)− τ j, τ j)
L(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j)
}
> 0. (26)
We now show that for ε−0 and, thus, ε
′, close enough to zero, the supremum over τ j ∈ A in
(26) is achieved at the supremum σi(τ i)− δ1 of A. To do so, we only need to check that, for
ε′ close enough to zero, the mapping τ j 7→ L(σi(τ i)− τ j, τ j)/L(σi(τ i)+ ε′− τ j, τ j) is strictly
decreasing over A. This in turn holds if its derivative is negative at all τ j in this interval,
that is, if
L1(σ
i(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j)− L2(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j)
L(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j) −
L1(σ
i(τ i)− τ j, τ j)− L2(σi(τ i)− τ j, τ j)
L(σi(τ i)− τ j, τ j)
=
∫ σi(τ i)+ε′
σi(τ i)
[
(L11 − L12)L− (L1 − L2)L1
L2
]
(t− τ j, τ j) dt
=
∫ σi(τ i)+ε′
σi(τ i)
[(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](t− τ j, τ j) dt
is negative for any such τ j. (Observe that ε′ must be uniform in τ j.) Because σi(τ i)− τ j >
δ1 > 0 for all τ
j ∈ A and because L is positive and thrice continuously differentiable over
[σi(τ i) − τ j,∞) × A by Assumption 1, there exists a bound C > 0 such that, for each
ε′ ∈ [0, ε−0 ] and for each (t, τ j) ∈ [σi(τ i), σi(τ i) + ε′]× A,
[(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](t− τ j, τ j) ≤ [(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](σi(τ i)− τ j, τ j) + C[t− σi(τ i)].
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Thus, for each (ε′, τ j) ∈ [0, ε−0 ]× A,∫ σi(τ i)+ε′
σi(τ i)
[(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](t− τ j, τ j) dt
≤
(
max
τˆ j∈clA
{
[(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](σi(τ i)− τˆ j, τˆ j)
}
+
C
2
ε′
)
ε′. (27)
Now, because σi(τ i)− τˆ j ≥ δ1 > 0 for all τˆ j ∈ clA, the function to be maximized in (27) is
continuous over the compact interval clA as L is thrice continuously differentiable over the
relevant range. Thus it attains its maximum. Moreover, by Assumption 2, this maximum
must be negative, as σi(τ i) − τˆ j ≤ M(τˆ j) for all τˆ j ∈ clA. Therefore, letting ε−0 and, thus,
ε′, be close enough to zero, we get that the left-hand side of (27) is negative for all τ j ∈ A,
as desired. It follows that, for such ε−0 and ε
′,
sup
τ j∈A
{
1− L(σ
i(τ i)− τ j, τ j)
L(σi(τ i) + ε′ − τ j, τ j)
}
= 1− L(δ1, σ
i(τ i)− δ1)
L(δ1 + ε′, σi(τ i)− δ1) .
In turn, because L(·, σi(τ i)− δ1) is strictly increasing over [0,M(σi(τ i)− δ1)],
sup
ε′∈[0,ε−0 ]
{
1− L(δ1, σ
i(τ i)− δ1)
L(δ1 + ε′, σi(τ i)− δ1)
}
= 1− L(δ1, σ
i(τ i)− δ1)
L(δ1 + ε
−
0 , σ
i(τ i)− δ1)
for all small enough ε−0 ∈ [0,M(σi(τ i)− δ1)− δ1]. (Note that M(σi(τ i)− δ1) + σi(τ i)− δ1 >
M(τ j)+τ j ≥ σi(τ i) for all τ j ∈ A, so that this interval is not reduced to {0}.) As δ1 > 0, one
can let ε−0 go to zero, and we get that the left-hand side of (26) is zero. This contradiction
establishes Claim 1. The result follows.
(iii) Suppose, by way of contradiction, that σi(0) < σj(0) for some i. By Lemma 1(i),
σj(0) ≤ M(0) and hence σi(0) < M(0). By Lemma 1(ii), σj(τ) > σj(0) for all τ > 0, and
hence σj(τ) > tˆi for all τ ≥ 0 and tˆi ∈ (σi(0), σj(0)). It follows that for any such tˆi
V i(σi(0), 0, σj) = L(σi(0), 0) < L(tˆi, 0) = V i(tˆi, 0, σj),
which is ruled out by (2). This contradiction establishes that σa(0) = σb(0). The result
follows.
Observe for future reference that the conclusions of Lemma 1 more generally hold when
τ˜a and τ˜ b are independently drawn from continuously differentiable distributions Ga and Gb
with positive densities G˙a and G˙b over [0,∞). The only change in the proofs is in (21),
where ‘Gj’ should be substituted to ‘G’ throughout. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) The proof goes through a series of steps.
Step 1 We first prove that, in any equilibrium, if the players’ equilibrium strategies have
discontinuity points, then the corresponding gaps in the distributions of their moving times
σa(τ˜a) and σb(τ˜ b) cannot overlap. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that they do. Then,
because these distributions have no atoms by Lemma 1(ii) along with the assumption that
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the breakthrough distribution has no atoms, there would exist some player i and some
discontinuity point τ i of σi such that, for some ε > 0, with probability 1 player j does
not make a move during [σi(τ i−), σi(τ i−) + ε]. One must have σi(τ i−) < τ i +M(τ i), for,
otherwise, one would have σi(τ i+) > τ i+M(τ i) as σi is discontinuous at τ i, and hence some
type τˆ i of player i close to but above τ i would have a maturation delay strictly longer than
M(τˆ i), which is impossible by Lemma 1(i). (Here we exploit the fact thatM(τ) is continuous
and even twice continuously differentiable in τ , as M˙(τ) = −L12(M(τ), τ)/L11(M(τ), τ) by
the implicit function theorem.) As a result, one cannot have τ i = 0, for, otherwise, player
i with type 0 would be strictly better off making a move at time [σi(0) + ε/2] ∧M(0), as
she would thereby increase her payoff from moving first, while still avoiding any preemption
risk. Thus one can choose τˆ i < τ i close enough to τ i such that σi(τ i−) < τˆ i +M(τˆ i) and
L([σi(τ i−) + ε− τˆ i] ∧M(τˆ i), τˆ i) > P[σ
j(τ˜ j) > σi(τˆ i)]
P[σj(τ˜ j) > σi(τ i−)] L(σ
i(τˆ i)− τˆ i, τˆ i).
One then has, letting tˆi ≡ [σi(τ i−) + ε] ∧ [τˆ i +M(τˆ i)] and using the facts that L(·, τˆ i) is
strictly increasing over [0,M(τˆ i)] and that the distribution of σj(τ˜ j) has no atom and does
not charge the interval [σi(τ i−), σi(τ i−) + ε],
V i(σi(τˆ i), τˆ i, σj) = P[σj(τ˜ j) > σi(τˆ i)]L(σi(τˆ i)− τˆ i, τˆ i)
< P[σj(τ˜ j) > σi(τ i−)]L(tˆi − τˆ i, τˆ i)
= P[σj(τ˜ j) > tˆi]L(tˆi − τˆ i, τˆ i)
= V i(tˆi, τˆ i, σj),
which is ruled out by (2). This contradiction establishes that the gaps, if any exists, in
the distributions of σi(τ˜ j) and σj(τ˜ j) cannot overlap. This notably rules out discontinuous
symmetric equilibria.
Step 2 From Step 1 along with the fact that σj can only have jump discontinuities, if
player i’s equilibrium strategy has a discontinuity point at τ i, then τ i > 0 and the set
φj((σi(τ i−), σi(τ i+))) is well defined. We first prove that in such a case σj(τ j) = τ j+M(τ j)
for all τ j ∈ φj((σi(τ i−), σi(τ i+))). Indeed, suppose, by way of contradiction, that σj(τ j) <
τ j +M(τ j) for such a type τ j. One then has, letting tˆj = σi(τ i+) ∧ [τ j +M(τ j)] and using
the facts that L(·, τ j) is strictly increasing over [0,M(τ j)] and that the distribution of σi(τ˜ i)
has no atom and does not charge the interval [σi(τ i−), σi(τ i+)],
V j(σj(τ j), τ j, σi) = P[σi(τ˜ i) > σj(τ j)]L(σj(τ j)− τ j, τ j)
< P[σi(τ˜ i) > tˆj]L(tˆj − τ j, τ j)
= V j(tˆj, τ j, σi),
which is ruled out by (2). This contradiction establishes the claim. Now, consider type
τ j ≡ sup φj((σi(τ i−), σi(τ i+))). Because σj(τ j) = τ j +M(τ j) for all τ j < τ j close enough
to τ j, it follows from Lemma 1(i)–(ii) that σj(τ j) = τ j + M(τ j), so that τ j = φj(τ j +
M(τ j)) = φj(σi(τ i+)). Finally, consider type τ j ≡ inf φj((σi(τ i−), σi(τ i+))). Because
σj(τ j) = τ j +M(τ j) for all τ j > τ j close enough to τ j, σj is discontinuous at τ j if σj(τ j) <
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τ j + M(τ j) = σi(τ i−). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that this is the case. Then,
applying the above reasoning at τ j and interchanging the roles of i and j, we have that τ i ≡
sup φi((σj(τ j−), σj(τ j+))) = φi(σj(τ j+)) and σi(τ i) = τ i +M(τ i). But σj(τ j+) = σi(τ i−)
so τ i = φi(σi(τ i−)) and hence σi(τ i) = σi(τ i−) and τ i = τ i. Thus, as σi(τ i) = τ i +M(τ i),
we get that σi(τ i−) = τ i+M(τ i), which is impossible as noted in Step 1. This contradiction
establishes that σj(τ j) = τ j +M(τ j), so that τ j = φj(τ j +M(τ j)) = φj(σi(τ i−)). Overall,
we have shown that σj(τ j) = τ j +M(τ j) for all τ j ∈ φj([σi(τ i−), σi(τ i+)]). Observe for
future reference that φj(σi(τ i−)) = τ j < τ i. This follows from the fact that τ j < τ j
as σj(τ j) = σi(τ i−) < σi(τ i+) = σj(τ j), and that, moreover, τ j ≤ τ i, for, otherwise,
σj(τ j) = τ j +M(τ j) > τ i +M(τ i) ≥ σi(τ i+), which is impossible as σj(τ j) = σi(τ i+).
Step 3 Suppose as in Step 2 that player i’s equilibrium strategy has a discontinuity
point at τ i > 0. Then consider type τ˜ = sup{τ ∈ [0, τ i) : σi(τ) ≥ σj(τ)}, which is
well defined as σi(0) = σj(0), and strictly less than τ i as σj(τ) > σi(τ i−) > σi(τ) for
all τ ∈ (φj(σi(τ i−)), τ i) by Step 2. Observe that σj must be continuous over (τ˜ , τ i], for,
otherwise, it would follow from Step 2 that σi(τ) = τ +M(τ) ≥ σj(τ) for some τ ∈ (τ˜ , τ i),
in contradiction with the definition of τ˜ . We now show that σi(τ˜+) = σj(τ˜+). Clearly
one must have σi(τ˜+) ≤ σj(τ˜+), for, otherwise, one would have σi(τ) > σj(τ) for some
τ ∈ (τ˜ , τ i), in contradiction with the definition of τ˜ . So suppose, by way of contradiction,
that σi(τ˜+) < σj(τ˜+). By Lemma 1(iii) and Step 1, one must have τ˜ > 0. Then, according
to the definition of τ˜ , there exists a strictly increasing sequence {τn} converging to τ˜ such
that σi(τn) ≥ σj(τn) for all n. Thus σj(τ˜+) > σi(τ˜+) > σi(τn) ≥ σj(τn), which shows that
σj is discontinuous at τ˜ . But it then follows from Step 2, interchanging the roles of i and
j, that σi(τ˜+) ≥ σj(τ˜+). Together with the fact that σi(τ˜+) ≤ σj(τ˜+), this contradiction
shows that σi(τ˜+) = σj(τ˜+) ≡ σ˜, as claimed.
Step 4 Define τ i, τ˜ , and σ˜ as in Step 3. Consider the functions φi and φj. As for φj, it
is continuous and strictly increasing over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) because σj is strictly increasing and
continuous over (τ˜ , τ i) by Lemma 1(ii) and Step 3. As for φi, it may not be defined over
the entire interval (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) because σi may have discontinuity points in (τ˜ , τ i). Yet, one
can straightforwardly extend φi to all of (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) by requiring it to be constant over any
interval [σi−, σ
i
+] corresponding to a discontinuity point of σ
i. Call φi the function generated
in this way, which is continuous and nondecreasing. We first establish that φi and φj are
Lipschitz over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)).
We start with φj and study to that effect the incentives of player i. Two cases must be
distinguished. First, if t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−))∩ σi([0,∞)), then φi(t) is well defined. Because φj is
continuous over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)), so is the maximization problem faced by any type of player i
that belongs to (τ˜ , τ i). Hence, by Berge’s maximum theorem, the maximizer correspondence
is upper hemicontinuous in player i’s type. In the present case, this notably implies that we
can without loss of generality assume that there exists a strictly increasing sequence {tn}
converging to t in (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)). (This amounts to make the convention that
σi(τ) = σi(τ−) at any discontinuity point τ ∈ (τ˜ , τ i) of σi.) By Lemma 1(i), t > φi(t). Thus
for n large enough, type φi(t) could deviate and make a move at time tn as type φ
i(tn) does.
It follows from (2) along with the fact that the distribution of σj(τ˜ j) has no atom by Lemma
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1(ii) that
[1−G(φj(t))]L(t− φi(t), φi(t)) = P[σj(τ˜ j) > t]L(t− φi(t), φi(t))
= V i(t, φi(t), σj)
≥ V i(tn, φi(t), σj)
= P[σj(τ˜ j) > tn]L(tn − φi(t), φi(t))
= [1−G(φj(tn))]L(tn − φi(t), φi(t))
for n large enough. Rearranging and using the fact that φj is strictly increasing, we get
0 < G(φj(t))−G(φj(tn)) ≤ [1−G(φj(t))] L(t− φ
i(t), φi(t))− L(tn − φi(t), φi(t))
L(tn − φi(t), φi(t))
for n large enough. Dividing through by t − tn and letting tn increase to t > φi(t), we
conclude that
0 ≤ D−[G ◦ φj](t) ≤ [1−G(φj(t))] L1
L
(t− φi(t), φi(t)), t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)), (28)
where D−[G◦φj](t) is the lower left Dini derivative of G◦φj at t. As t−φi(t) is bounded away
from zero over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)), it follows that D−[G ◦ φj] is bounded over this set.
Now, turn to the case where t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−))\σi([0,∞)), assuming that this set is nonempty.
Note that it is then composed of a countable number of intervals. Over each of these intervals,
one has φj(t) = t−M(φj(t)) by Step 2. Because τ+M(τ) is twice continuously differentiable
in τ , with positive derivative [(L11 − L12)/L11](M(τ), τ) according to the implicit function
theorem and Assumptions 1–2, we get that φj is continuously differentiable over (σ˜, σi(τ i−))\
σi([0,∞)), with a bounded derivative. Because G is also continuously differentiable, there
exists a constant K such that
0 ≤ D−[G ◦ φj](t) ≤ K, t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) \ σi([0,∞)). (29)
Combining the bounds (28) and (29), we get that G ◦ φj is Lipschitz over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) (see
for instance Giorgi and Komlo´si (1992, Lemma 1.15)). Moreover, because G˙ is continuous
and positive over [0,∞), G−1 is locally Lipschitz over [0, 1). Hence φj is Lipschitz over
(σ˜, σi(τ i−)).
We consider next φi and study to that effect the incentives of player j. Again, two cases
must be distinguished. First suppose that t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)), and consider an
approximating sequence {tn} as above. By Lemma 1(i), t > φj(t). Thus for n large enough,
type φj(t) could deviate and make a move at time tn as type φ
j(tn) does. Proceeding in a
similar way as above, and using the fact that φi = φi over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)), we get
0 < G(φi(t))−G(φi(tn)) ≤ [1−G(φi(t))] L(t− φ
j(t), φj(t))− L(tn − φj(t), φj(t))
L(tn − φj(t), φj(t))
for n large enough. Dividing through by t − tn and letting tn increase to t > φi(t) = φi(t),
we conclude that
0 ≤ D−[G ◦ φi](t) ≤ [1−G(φi(t))] L1
L
(t− φj(t), φj(t)), t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)), (30)
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As t − φj(t) is bounded away from zero over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)), it follows that
D−[G ◦ φi] is bounded over this set. Now, if t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) \ σi([0,∞)), then φi is constant
over (t− ε, t] for some ε > 0 according to our convention. Thus
D−[G ◦ φi](t) = 0, t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) \ σi([0,∞)). (31)
Combining the bounds (30) and (31), and reasoning as in the case of φj, we obtain that φi
is Lipschitz over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)).
Step 5 Define the functions φi and φj as in Step 4. Because they are Lipschitz over
(σ˜, σi(τ i−)), they are absolutely continuous and thus almost everywhere differentiable over
this interval. Their derivatives, where they exist, can be evaluated as follows. Consider first
some t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) \ σi([0,∞)). If φi and φj are differentiable at t, then φ˙i(t) = 0 and
φ˙j(t) = 1/[1 + M˙(φj(t))]. Consider next some t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)). If φi and φj are
differentiable at t, then φ˙i(t) (respectively φ˙j(t)) is obtained by differentiating the mapping
tˆ 7→ [1 − G(φi(tˆ))]L(tˆ − φj(t), φj(t)) (respectively tˆ 7→ [1 − G(φj(tˆ))]L(tˆ − φi(t), φi(t))) and
requiring that the resulting derivative, whenever it exists, be equal to zero at tˆ = t, as
implied by optimality. (Observe that in this case φi(t) = φi(t).) For any such t, this yields
φ˙i(t) =
1−G
G˙
(φi(t))
L1
L
(t− φj(t), φj(t)), (32)
φ˙j(t) =
1−G
G˙
(φj(t))
L1
L
(t− φi(t), φi(t)). (33)
Define now the quantity
R(t) ≡ ln
(
1−G(φj(t))
1−G(φi(t))
)
, t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)). (34)
Using that φi and φj are absolutely continuous over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)), that G˙ is continuous, that
G ◦ φi and G ◦ φj are bounded away from 1 over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)), and thus that the logarithm
function is Lipschitz over the corresponding range of (1−G ◦φj)/(1−G ◦φi), we get that R
is absolutely continuous over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) and hence is equal to the integral of its derivative,
which is well defined almost everywhere. Now, for each t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) \ σi([0,∞)) such
that φi and φj are differentiable at t, we have φ˙i(t) = 0 and φ˙j(t) = 1/[1 + M˙(φj(t))], and,
therefore,
R˙(t) = −
[
G˙
(1−G)(1 + M˙)
]
(φj(t)),
which is negative as G˙ is bounded away from zero and 1 + M˙ is positive. Similarly, for
each t ∈ (σ˜, σi(τ i−)) ∩ σi([0,∞)) such that φi and φj are differentiable at t, we have, using
(32)–(33),
R˙(t) =
G˙
1−G (φ
i(t)) φ˙i(t)− G˙
1−G (φ
j(t)) φ˙j(t)
36
=
L1
L
(t− φj(t), φj(t))− L1
L
(t− φi(t), φi(t))
=
∫ φi(t)
φj(t)
[
(L11 − L12)L− (L1 − L2)L1
L2
]
(t− τ, τ) dτ
=
∫ φi(t)
φj(t)
[(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](t− τ, τ) dτ,
which is negative according to Assumption 2, owing to the fact that φj < φi over (σ˜, σi(τ i−))
according to the definition of σ˜ in Step 2, and to the fact that t− τ ≤M(τ) for all τ ≥ φj(t)
as t ≤ φj(t)+M(φj(t)). We thus obtain that R is strictly decreasing over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)). Now,
as observed in Step 2, φj(σi(τ i−)) < τ i = φi(σi(τ i−)). Thus, by (34), R(σi(τ i−)) > 0 and,
therefore, as R is strictly decreasing over (σ˜, σi(τ i−)), R(σ˜+) > 0. This, however, is ruled
out by the fact that, as shown in Step 3, σi(τ˜+) = σj(τ˜+) = σ˜, so that φi(σ˜+) = φj(σ˜+) = τ˜
and thus, by (34) again, R(σ˜+) = 0. This contradiction establishes that σi is continuous for
all i. The result follows.
(ii) It follows from Lemma 2(i) that φa and φb are defined and absolutely continuous over
[σ(0),∞), and that they satisfy (4) almost everywhere in (σ(0),∞). As a result,
φi(t) = φi(t0) +
∫ t
t0
1−G
G˙
(φi(s))
L1
L
(s− φj(s), φj(s)) ds, t > t0 > σ(0), i = a, b. (35)
But because, for each i, s− φj(s) is bounded away from zero over any compact subinterval
of (σ(0),∞), the integrand in (35) is continuous in s over any such interval. Thus, by the
fundamental theorem of calculus, one may differentiate (35) everywhere with respect to t
to get that (4) holds for all t > σ(0). To conclude the proof, observe that for each i, φi
is continuous at σ(0) by Lemma 1(ii), and that so is the integrand in (35) and thus φ˙i as
σ(0) > 0 by Lemma 1(i). This implies that φ˙i can be continuously extended at σ(0). The
result follows. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that φi(t) > φj(t) for some t > σ(0).
As φi(σ(0)) = φj(σ(0)), t0 ≡ sup{s ∈ [σ(0), t) : φi(s) = φj(s)} is well defined and strictly
less than t. Moreover, φi(t0) = φ
j(t0) and φ
i > φj over (t0, t). Integrating (4) yields
ln
(
1−G(φj(t))
1−G(φi(t))
)
=
∫ t
t0
[
L1
L
(s− φj(s), φj(s))− L1
L
(s− φi(s), φi(s))
]
ds
=
∫ t
t0
∫ φi(s)
φj(s)
[
(L11 − L12)L− (L1 − L2)L1
L2
]
(s− τ, τ) dτ ds
=
∫ t
t0
∫ φi(s)
φj(s)
[(lnL)11 − (lnL)12](s− τ, τ) dτ ds. (36)
Because φi(t) > φj(t), the left-hand side of (36) is positive. However, the right-hand side of
(36) is negative according to Assumption 2, owing to the fact that φj < φi over (t0, t) and
to the fact that, for each s ∈ (t0, t), s− τ ≤M(τ) for all τ ≥ φj(s) as s ≤ φj(s) +M(φj(s)).
This contradiction establishes that φi(t) = φj(t) for all t > σ(0). The result follows. ¥
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Proof of Lemma 4. We must check that, for any type τ = φ(t) of player i, making a
move at time σ(τ) = t is a best response if player j plays the strategy σ. Observe first that
making a move at tˆ < σ(0) cannot be a best response, either because tˆ < φ(t), so that this
deviation is not feasible, or, when tˆ ≥ φ(t), because
V i(σ(0), φ(t), σ) = L(σ(0)− φ(t), φ(t)) > L(tˆ− φ(t), φ(t)) = V i(tˆ, φ(t), σ)
as σ is strictly increasing, L(·, φ(t)) is strictly increasing over [0,M(φ(t))], and tˆ − φ(t) <
σ(0) − φ(t) ≤ M(0) − φ(t) ≤ M(φ(t)). According to this observation, we can focus on
deviations by type φ(t) such that she mimics the behavior of an other type φ(tˆ) by making
a move at time tˆ. We can further restrict tˆ to be such that φ(t) ≤ tˆ ≤ φ(t) +M(φ(t)), for
other deviations are either not feasible or can be shown not to be best responses along the
lines of Lemma 1(i). Now, writing (5) at tˆ yields
L1
L
(tˆ− φ(t), φ(t)) = L1
L
(tˆ− φ(tˆ), φ(tˆ)) +
∫ φi(t)
φ(tˆ)
[
(L12 − L11)L+ (L1 − L2)L1
L2
]
(tˆ− τ, τ) dτ
=
G˙
1−G (φ(tˆ)) φ˙(tˆ) +
∫ φ(t)
φ(tˆ)
[(lnL)12 − (lnL)11](tˆ− τ, τ) dτ
R G˙
1−G (φ(tˆ)) φ˙(tˆ)
if φ(t) R φ(tˆ), that is, t R tˆ, according to Assumption 2, owing to the fact that tˆ− τ ≤M(τ)
for all τ between φ(tˆ) and φ(t) as tˆ ≤M(φ(tˆ))−φ(tˆ) by construction, and tˆ ≤M(φ(t))−φ(t)
by assumption. That is, for player i with type φ(t), the expected incremental payoff of
slightly delaying her move is positive at all tˆ < t and negative at all tˆ > t. As a result, the
second-order condition for problem
max
tˆ∈[φ(t),∞)
{[1−G(φ(tˆ))]L(tˆ− φ(t), φ(t))}
or, equivalently, as σ is strictly increasing,
max
tˆ∈[φ(t),∞)
{V i(tˆ, φ(t), σ)},
is satisfied when the first-order condition (5) is satisfied, for tˆ = t. The result follows. ¥
Proof of Theorem 1. We only need to show that there exists at least one value of
σ0 ∈ (0,M(0)) such that the solution to (5) with initial condition (σ0, 0) stays in D. It is
helpful for the purpose of this proof to consider the ODE for σ = φ−1. Specifically, for each
σ0 ∈ (0,M(0)), consider the following initial value problem:
σ˙(τ) =
1
f(σ(τ), τ)
, τ ≥ 0, (37)
σ(0) = σ0. (38)
It is easy to check from the definition (6) of f that, over the interior intD′ of the domain
D′ ≡ {(τ, t) : 0 ≤ τ < t ≤ τ +M(τ)}, the mapping (τ, t) 7→ 1/f(t, τ) is continuous and
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locally Lipschitz in σ. Hence, by the Cauchy–Lipschitz theorem, for each σ0 ∈ (0,M(0)),
problem (37)–(38) has a unique maximal solution σ(·, 0, σ0) in intD′ (see for instance Perko
(2001, Section 2.2, Theorem, and Section 2.4, Theorem 1)). Define also the degenerate
solutions σ(·, 0, 0) ≡ {(0, 0)} and σ(·, 0,M(0)) ≡ {(0,M(0))} for σ0 = 0 and σ0 = M(0),
respectively. For each σ0 ∈ [0,M(0)], let
τ(σ0) ≡ sup{τ ≥ 0 : (τ ′, σ(τ ′, 0, σ0)) ∈ intD′ for all τ ′ ∈ (0, τ)},
with sup ∅ = 0 by convention, so that τ(0) = τ(M(0)) = 0. The proof is complete if we
show that τ(σ0) =∞ for some σ0 ∈ (0,M(0)). To this end, define
L0 ≡ {σ0 ∈ [0,M(0)] : τ(σ0) <∞ and σ(τ(σ0), 0, σ0) = τ(σ0)},
U0 ≡ {σ0 ∈ [0,M(0)] : τ(σ0) <∞ and σ(τ(σ0), 0, σ0) = τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0))}.
Clearly L0 6= ∅ as 0 ∈ L0, U0 6= ∅ as M(0) ∈ U0, and L0 ∩ U0 = ∅. From the non-crossing
property of the solutions to (37)–(38) over intD′, L0 and U0 are intervals. If we knew that
both L0 and U0 were relatively open in [0,M(0)], then, because [0,M(0)] is connected and
thus cannot be the union of two disjoint open sets, we could argue that there must exist
some σ0 ∈ [0,M(0)] such that σ0 6∈ L0 ∪ U0. Given the definitions of τ(σ0), L0, and U0, it
would follow that τ(σ0) = ∞. More precisely, as L0 and U0 are intervals, one would have
L0 = [0, σ0) and U0 = (σ0,M(0)], where 0 < σ0 ≤ σ0 < M(0), so that τ(σ0) =∞ if and only
if σ0 ∈ Σ0 ≡ [σ0, σ0]. The proof that this is indeed the case relies on the following claim, the
proof of which can be found below.
Claim 2 For each (τ1, σ1) ∈ intD′, the terminal value problem
σ˙(τ) =
1
f(σ(τ), τ)
, τ ≤ τ1, (39)
σ(τ1) = σ1 (40)
has a unique solution σ(·, τ1, σ1) in D′ over [0, τ1].
Suppose Claim 2 established. We show that U0 is relatively open in [0,M(0)]. As U0
is an interval that contains M(0), we only need to show that if σ0 ∈ U0, then σ′0 ∈ U0
for some σ′0 < σ0. For each ε > 0, consider the solution σ(·, τ(σ0), τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0)) − ε)
to (39)–(40) with terminal condition σ(τ(σ0)) = τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0)) − ε. By Claim 2, this
solution can be maximally extended down to 0, and σ′0(ε) ≡ σ(0, τ(σ0), τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0))−
ε) ∈ (0, σ0) from the non-crossing property of the solutions to (37)–(38) over intD′. Now,
consider the solution σ(·, 0, σ′0(ε)) to (37)–(38) with initial condition σ(0) = σ′0(ε), so that
σ(τ(σ0), 0, σ
′
0(ε)) = τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0)) − ε, and suppose that σ′0(ε) 6∈ U0 for all ε > 0, so
that σ(·, 0, σ′0(ε)) never leaves D′ through its upper boundary t = τ +M(τ). Notice that,
because L1(M(τ(σ0)), τ(σ0)) = 0 and M(τ) is (twice) continuously differentiable in τ as
observed in the proof of Lemma 2, there exist an open ball B with radius η > 0 centered
at (τ(σ0), τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0))) that does not intersect the lower boundary t = τ of D′, and a
number
K > max
τ∈{τ ′≥0:(τ ′,τ ′+M(τ ′))∈B}
{1 + M˙(τ)} ≡ δB (41)
39
such that 1/f(σ, τ) ≥ K for all (σ, τ) ∈ B ∩ intD′. As the slope of the portion of the
upper boundary of D′ contained in B is at most δB, the segment of slope K connecting
(τ(σ0), τ(σ0) + M(τ(σ0)) − ε) to (τ(σ0) + ε/(K − δB), τ(σ0) + M(τ(σ0)) + δBε/(K − δB))
is entirely contained in B for all ε ∈ (0, (K − δB)η cos arctan δB). For any such ε, because
σ(·, 0, σ′0(ε)) does not leave D′ through its upper boundary, it must eventually leave B. But,
because of the above observation, and because σ(τ(σ0), 0, σ
′
0(ε)) = τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0))− ε, it
cannot do so before time τ(σ0) + ε/(K − δB). In particular,
σ
(
τ(σ0) +
ε
K − δB , 0, σ
′
0(ε)
)
≥ τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0))− ε+K
[
τ(σ0) +
ε
K − δB − τ(σ0)
]
= τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0)) +
δBε
K − δB
≥ τ(σ0) + ε
K − δB +M
(
τ(σ0) +
ε
K − δB
)
, (42)
where the last inequality follows from the definition (41) of δB. But (42) implies that
σ(·, 0, σ′0(ε)) must leave D′ through its upper boundary at a time τ ≤ τ(σ0) + ε/(K − δB),
a contradiction. It follows that σ′0(ε) ∈ U0 for all ε > 0 close enough to zero, which proves
the claim as σ′0(ε) < σ0 for any such ε. The proof that L0 is relatively open is similar, and
is therefore omitted. Hence the result.
σ = τ +M(τ)
•6
•
6
º
•
K
(τ(σ0), τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0)))
(τ(σ0), τ(σ0) +M(τ(σ0))− ε)
I
B
Figure 2 Illustration of the last step of the proof.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, it remains to prove Claim 2. By the Cauchy–
Lipschitz theorem, the terminal value problem (39)–(40) has a unique maximal solution
σ(·, τ1, σ1) in D′. Because (τ1, σ1) ∈ intD′,
τ0 ≡ inf {τ ≤ τ1 : (σ(τ ′, τ1, σ1), τ ′) ∈ intD′ for all τ ′ ∈ (τ, τ1)} < τ1.
We now show that τ0 = 0, which concludes the proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
τ0 > 0. Then, either σ(·, τ1, σ1) leaves D′ through its lower boundary, so that σ(τ0, τ1, σ1) =
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τ0, or σ(·, τ1, σ1) leaves D′ through its upper boundary, so that σ(τ0, τ1, σ1) = τ0+M(τ0). In
the first case, there exist ε0 ∈ (0, τ1− τ0) and k < 1 such that (∂σ/∂τ)(τ0+ ε, τ1, σ1) < k for
all ε ∈ (0, ε0). For any such ε, we have
σ(τ0 + ε, τ1, σ1) < σ(τ0, τ1, σ1) + kε = τ0 + kε < τ0 + ε,
so that (τ0 + ε, σ(τ0 + ε, τ1, σ1)) 6∈ intD′, which is impossible according to the definition of
τ0. In the second case, there exist ε0 ∈ (0, τ1 − τ0) and, by analogy with (41), a number
K > max
τ∈[τ0,τ0+ε0]
{1 + M˙(τ)} ≡ δ0 (43)
such that (∂σ/∂τ)(τ0 + ε, τ1, σ1) > K for all ε ∈ (0, ε0). For any such ε, we have
σ(τ0 + ε, τ1, σ1) < σ(τ0 + ε0, τ1, σ1)−K(ε0 − ε)
< τ0 + ε0 +M(τ0 + ε0)−K(ε0 − ε)
≤ τ0 +M(τ0)− (K − δ0)ε0 +Kε,
where the second inequality follows from the definition of τ0, and the third inequality follows
from the definition (43) of δ0. Letting ε go to zero then yields σ(τ0, τ1, σ1) ≤ τ0 +M(τ0) −
(K − δ0)ε0 < τ0 + M(τ0), which is impossible according to the definition of τ0. These
contradictions establish Claim 2. The result follows. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2. As a preliminary, observe that, for each τ , as L(·, τ) is ρ-concave
over [0,M(τ)] by Assumption 4 and ρ > 0, L(·, τ)ρ is concave over this interval and so
1− LL11
L21
(m, τ) ≥ ρ, τ ≥ 0, M(τ) > m ≥ 0. (44)
The logic of the proof is then similar to Hubbard and West (1991, Exercise 4.7#3). Consider
two equilibria (σ1, σ1) and (σ2, σ2) with σ1(0) ≥ σ2(0) and define
g(τ) ≡ σ1(τ)− σ2(τ), τ ≥ 0. (45)
By construction,
M(τ) > σ1(τ)− τ ≥ σ2(τ)− τ > 0 (46)
for all τ ≥ 0, where the middle inequality follows from the non-crossing property of the
solutions to (37)–(38) over intD′ along with the assumption that σ1(0) ≥ σ2(0). From
(45)–(46), we get that
0 ≤ g(τ) ≤M(τ) (47)
for all τ ≥ 0. Furthermore, for any such τ , we have
g˙(τ) =
G˙
1−G (τ)
[
L
L1
(σ1(τ)− τ, τ)− L
L1
(σ2(τ)− τ, τ)
]
≥ G˙
1−G (τ) minm∈[σ2(τ)−τ,σ1(τ)−τ ]
{(
L
L1
)
1
(m, τ)
}
[σ1(τ)− σ2(τ)]
=
G˙
1−G (τ) minm∈[σ2(τ)−τ,σ1(τ)−τ ]
{
1− LL11
L21
(m, τ)
}
g(τ)
≥ G˙
1−G (τ) ρg(τ), (48)
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where the first equality follows from (6) and (37), the second equality follows from (45), and
the second inequality follows from (44). Integrating (48) yields
g(τ) ≥ g(0) exp
(
ρ
∫ τ
0
G˙
1−G (θ) dθ
)
=
1
[1−G(τ)]ρ g(0) (49)
and thus, by (47),
0 ≤ g(0) ≤M(τ)[1−G(τ)]ρ
for all τ , so that
0 ≤ g(0) ≤ lim inf
τ→∞
{M(τ)[1−G(τ)]ρ} = 0,
where the equality follows from Assumption 3 along with the assumption that ρ > 0. This
shows that g(0) = 0 and thus that σ1(0) = σ2(0). From the uniqueness part of the Cauchy–
Lipschitz theorem, we finally obtain that σ1 = σ2. Hence the result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. To simply notation, let B ≡ G˙/(1 − G). Suppose first that the
mapping (8) has a positive derivative over Tm for all m. The proof that µ(τ) is strictly
decreasing in τ consists of two steps.
Step 1 We first show that one cannot have µ˙ ≥ 0 over an interval [τ0,∞). According to
(7), we have
µ¨(τ) = E(µ(τ), τ) +B(τ)µ˙(τ)F (µ(τ), τ), (50)
where
E(m, τ) ≡ B˙(τ) L
L1
(m, τ) +B(τ)
(
L
L1
)
2
(m, τ)
and
F (m, τ) ≡
(
L
L1
)
1
(m, τ).
Imposing that the mapping (8) has a positive derivative over Tm for all m is equivalent to
imposing that E > 0 over {(m, τ) : 0 < m < M(τ)}. Moreover, observe that F > 0 over
this domain because, for each τ , L(·, τ) is strictly log-concave over [0,M(τ)] by Assumption
4. Therefore, according to (50), µ˙(τ) ≥ 0 implies that µ¨(τ) > 0. Thus, if one had µ˙ ≥ 0 over
an interval [τ0,∞), µ˙(τ) would have a well-defined limit µ˙(∞) ∈ (0,∞] as τ goes to infinity.
But then, as lim infτ→∞ {M(τ)} < ∞ by Assumption 3, µ(τ) would exceed M(τ) at some
time τ , which is impossible. This contradiction establishes that there are arbitrarily large
times τ0 such that µ˙(τ0) < 0.
Step 2 Fix τ0 > 0 such that µ˙(τ0) < 0, and let us show that µ˙ < 0 over [0, τ0]. Suppose
the contrary holds, and let τ1 ≡ sup{τ < τ0 : µ˙(τ) ≥ 0}. Then µ˙(τ1) = 0 and µ¨(τ1) ≤ 0.
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Letting µ˙(τ1) = 0 in (50) yields
µ¨(τ1) = E(µ(τ1), τ1) > 0,
a contradiction. Hence µ˙ < 0 over [0, τ0], as claimed. Because τ0 can be arbitrarily large by
Step 1, we have µ˙ < 0 over [0,∞).
The proof that µ(τ) is strictly increasing in τ when the mapping (8) has a negative
derivative over Tm for all m is similar. The only modification to Step 1 consists in observing
that if µ˙ > −1 is strictly decreasing over some interval [τ0,∞), then µ˙(τ) has a well-defined
finite limit µ˙(∞) as τ goes to infinity. Hence the result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider first a change in the breakthrough distribution. Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that µ(τ0) ≤ µ(τ0) for some τ0 ≥ 0. Then, because (L/L1)(·, τ) is
strictly increasing over [0,M(τ)) by Assumption 4, it follows from (7) and (9) that
µ˙(τ0) =
G˙
1−G (τ0)
L
L1
(µ(τ0), τ0)− 1 > G˙
1−G (τ0)
L
L1
(µ(τ0), τ0)− 1 = µ˙(τ0), (51)
so that µ(τ) > µ(τ) for all τ > τ0 close enough to τ0. We now show that µ > µ over (τ0,∞).
Suppose the contrary holds, and let τ1 ≡ inf {τ > τ0 : µ(τ) ≤ µ(τ)}. Then µ(τ1) = µ(τ1)
and µ˙(τ1) ≤ µ˙(τ1). Proceeding as for (51), however, shows that µ(τ1) = µ(τ1) implies that
µ˙(τ1) > µ˙(τ1), a contradiction. Hence the claim. Now, by analogy with (45), define
g(τ) ≡ µ(τ)− µ(τ), τ ≥ τ0. (52)
We have by construction
M(τ) > µ(τ) ≥ µ(τ) > 0 (53)
for all τ ≥ τ0. From (52)–(53), we get that
0 ≤ g(τ) ≤M(τ) (54)
for all τ ≥ τ0. Furthermore, for any such τ , we have
g˙(τ) =
G˙
1−G (τ)
L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)− G˙
1−G (τ)
L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)
>
G˙
1−G (τ)
[
L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)− L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)
]
≥ G˙
1−G (τ) ρg(τ) (55)
for all τ ≥ τ0, where the first inequality follows from (9), and the second inequality follows
along the same lines as (48). Fixing some ε > 0 and integrating (55) yields
g(τ) ≥ g(τ0 + ε) exp
(
ρ
∫ τ
τ0+ε
G˙
1−G (θ) dθ
)
=
[
1−G(τ0 + ε)
1−G(τ)
]ρ
g(τ0 + ε),
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and thus, by (54),
0 ≤ g(τ0 + ε) ≤M(τ)
[
1−G(τ)
1−G(τ0 + ε)
]ρ
for all τ ≥ τ0, so that
0 ≤ g(τ0 + ε) ≤ lim inf
τ→∞
{
M(τ)
[
1−G(τ)
1−G(τ0 + ε)
]ρ}
= 0,
where the equality follows from Assumption 3 along with the assumption that ρ > 0. This,
however, is impossible, as g > 0 over (τ0,∞). This contradiction establishes that µ(τ) > µ(τ)
for all τ .
Consider next a change in the payoff function. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
µ(τ0) ≤ µ(τ0) for some τ0 ≥ 0. Then, because both (L/L1)(·, τ) and (L/L1)(·, τ) are strictly
increasing over [0,M(τ)) by Assumption 4 along with the fact that M(τ) ≤M(τ), it follows
from (7) and (10) that
µ˙(τ0) =
G˙
1−G (τ0)
L
L1
(µ(τ0), τ0)− 1 > G˙
1−G (τ0)
L
L1
(µ(τ0), τ0)− 1 = µ˙(τ0),
so that µ(τ) > µ(τ) for all τ > τ0 close enough to τ0. As in the case of a change in the
breakthrough distribution, we can deduce from this that µ > µ over (τ0,∞). Defining g as
in (52), the analogues of (53)–(54) hold. For each τ ≥ τ0, we have
g˙(τ) =
G˙
1−G (τ)
[
L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)− L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)
]
>
G˙
1−G (τ)
[
L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)− L
L1
(µ(τ), τ)
]
≥ G˙
1−G (τ) ρg(τ) (56)
for all τ ≥ τ0, where the first inequality follows from (10) and the second inequality follows
along the same lines as (48). The remainder of the proof is as in the case of a change in the
breakthrough distribution. Hence the result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Let B ≡ G˙/(1 − G) as in the proof of Proposition 1. Suppose
first that the mapping (15) has a positive derivative over Tq for all q. The proof that χ(τ) is
strictly decreasing in τ consists of two steps.
Step 1 We first show that one cannot have χ˙ ≥ 0 over an interval [τ0,∞). According to
(13), we have
χ¨(τ) = X(χ(τ), τ) + χ˙(τ)Y (χ(τ), τ), (57)
where
X(q, τ) ≡ B˙(τ) H
H1
(q, τ) +B(τ)
(
H
H1
)
2
(q, τ)−
(
T2
T1
)
2
(q, τ)
44
and
Y (q, τ) ≡ B(τ)
(
H
H1
)
1
(q, τ)−
(
T2
T1
)
1
(q, τ).
Imposing that the mapping (15) has a positive derivative over Tq for all q is equivalent to
imposing that X > 0 over {(q, τ) : 0 < q < Q(M(τ), τ)}. Moreover, observe that Y > 0
over this domain because, as observed above, (H/H1)1(q, τ) is positive over this domain by
Assumption 7, and (T2/T1)1(q, τ) = (Q11 − Q12)(T (q, τ) − τ, τ)T1(q, τ) is nonnegative by
Assumptions 5–6. Therefore, according to (57), χ˙(τ) ≥ 0 implies that χ¨(τ) > 0. Thus,
if one had χ˙ ≥ 0 over an interval [τ0,∞), χ˙(τ) would have a well-defined limit χ˙(∞) ∈
(0,∞] as τ goes to infinity. But then, as lim infτ→∞ {M(τ)} < ∞ by Assumption 3 and
limτ→∞ {Q(m, τ)} < ∞ for all m by Assumption 5, µ(τ) would exceed M(τ) at some time
τ , which is impossible. This contradiction establishes that there are arbitrarily large times
τ0 such that χ˙(τ0) < 0.
Step 2 Fix τ0 > 0 such that χ˙(τ0) < 0, and let us show that χ˙ < 0 over [0, τ0]. Suppose
the contrary holds, and let τ1 ≡ sup{τ < τ0 : χ˙(τ) ≥ 0}. Then χ˙(τ1) = 0 and χ¨(τ1) ≤ 0.
Letting χ˙(τ1) = 1 in (57) yields
χ¨(τ1) = X(χ(τ1), τ1) > 0,
a contradiction. Hence χ˙ < 0 over [0, τ0], as claimed. Because τ0 can be arbitrarily large by
Step 1, we have χ˙ < 0 over [0,∞).
The proof that χ(τ) is strictly increasing in τ when the mapping (15) has a negative
derivative over Tq for all q is similar. The only modification to Step 1 consists in observing
that if χ˙ is strictly decreasing over some interval [τ0,∞), then χ˙(τ) has a well-defined limit
χ˙(∞) ∈ [−∞, 0) as τ goes to infinity. The claim follows. Hence the result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. We use identity (14) throughout the proof. We will rely on the
following claim.
Claim 3 For all q > 0, τ ≥ 0, and d ∈ [0, 1],
T1(q, τ ; d) > 0, (58)
T3(q, τ ; d) > 0. (59)
For all m > 0, τ ≥ 0, and d ∈ [0, 1],
(Q1 −Q2)1(m, τ ; d) ≤ 0, (60)
(Q1 −Q2)3(m, τ ; d) < 0. (61)
Finally, if ξ¨ < 0, then, for all q > 0, τ ≥ 0, and d ∈ [0, 1],
T13(q, τ ; d) > 0. (62)
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Proof. Inequality (58) follows from Assumption 5 along with the implicit definition (11) of
T (q, τ ; d), that is, in the present context,
Q(T (q, τ ; d)− τ, τ ; d) = q. (63)
Inequality (59) follows from Assumption 5 and (63), observing from (16) that Q3(m, τ ; d) < 0
as ξ˙ > 0. Inequality (60) follows from (16), which yields (Q1 − Q2)1(m, τ ; d) = −dξ˙(τ) ≤ 0
as ξ˙ > 0. Inequality (61) follows from (16), which yields (Q1 −Q2)3(m, τ ; d) = −ξ˙(τ)m < 0
as ξ˙ > 0. Note that (58)–(61) do not require ξ¨ < 0.
Consider now inequality (62). According to (63), we have
T1(q, τ ; d) =
1
Q1
(T (q, τ ; d)− τ, τ ; d), (64)
T3(q, τ ; d) = − Q3
Q1
(T (q, τ ; d)− τ, τ ; d). (65)
It follows from (64)–(65) that T13(q, τ ; d) > 0 if and only if
(Q11Q3 −Q13Q1)(T (q, τ ; d)− τ, τ ; d) > 0.
An explicit computation using (16) yields that this in turn holds whenever
ξ(τ)[ξ(τ +m)− ξ(τ)] + (1− d)
{
[ξ(τ +m)− ξ(τ)]2 − ξ˙(τ +m)
∫ τ+m
τ
[ξ(s)− ξ(τ)] ds
}
> 0
for all m > 0 and τ ≥ 0. The first term of this sum is positive as ξ˙ > 0. The second term is
bounded below by (1− d)[ξ(τ +m)− ξ(τ)][ξ(τ +m)− ξ(τ)− ξ˙(τ +m)m] as ξ˙ > 0, which is
nonnegative for all d ∈ [0, 1] as ξ¨ < 0. The claim follows. ¥
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that χ(τ0; d) ≤ χ(τ0; d) for some τ0 ≥ 0. Then
(Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ0; d), τ0; d)− τ0, τ0; d) ≤ (Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ0; d), τ0; d)− τ0, τ0; d)
≤ (Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ0; d), τ0; d)− τ0, τ0; d)
< (Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ0; d), τ0; d)− τ0, τ0; d), (66)
where the first inequality follows from (58) and (60), the second inequality follows from
(59)–(60), and the third inequality follows from (61). Moreover, recall that from
H(q, τ ; d) ≡ exp(−r[T (q, τ ; d)− τ ])P (q),
we have
H1
H
(q, τ ; d) = −rT1(q, τ ; d) + P
′
P
(q).
Assumption 7 implies that (H1/H)1 < 0 over the relevant range. Moreover, (62) implies
that (H1/H)3 < 0 when ξ¨ < 0. Combining these two observations with the assumption that
χ(τ0; d) ≤ χ(τ0; d), we have
H1
H
(χ(τ0, d), τ0; d) ≥ H1
H
(χ(τ0, d), τ0; d) >
H1
H
(χ(τ0, d), τ0; d). (67)
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It follows from (66)–(67) that
χ˙(τ0; d) =
G˙
1−G (τ0)
H
H1
(χ(τ0, d), τ0; d)− (Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ0; d), τ0; d)− τ0, τ0; d)
>
G˙
1−G (τ0)
H
H1
(χ(τ0, d), τ0; d)− (Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ0; d), τ0; d)− τ0, τ0; d)
= χ˙(τ0; d).
As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can deduce from this that χ(·; d) > χ(·; d) over (τ0,∞).
Now, by analogy with (45), define
g(τ) ≡ χ(τ ; d)− χ(τ, d), τ ≥ 0. (68)
For each τ , let M(τ ; d) be the unique maximum of L(·, τ ; d). By construction,
Q(M(τ ; d), τ ; d) > χ(τ, d) ≥ χ(τ, d) > 0 (69)
for all τ ≥ τ0. From (68)–(69), we get that
0 ≤ g(τ) ≤ Q(M(τ ; d), τ ; d) (70)
for all τ ≥ τ0. Furthermore, for any such τ , we have
g˙(τ) =
G˙
1−G (τ)
[
H
H1
(χ(τ, d), τ ; d)− H
H1
(χ(τ, d), τ ; d)
]
− [(Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ ; d), τ ; d)− τ, τ ; d)− (Q1 −Q2)(T (χ(τ ; d), τ ; d)− τ, τ ; d)]
>
G˙
1−G (τ)
[
H
H1
(χ(τ, d), τ ; d)− H
H1
(χ(τ, d), τ ; d)
]
≥ G˙
1−G (τ) ρg(τ) (71)
where the first inequality follows from (66) along with the fact that (H1/H)3 < 0 and the
second inequality follows along the same lines as (48). The remainder of the proof is as in the
proof of Proposition 2, bearing in mind that, as lim infτ→∞ {M(τ ; d)} < ∞ by Assumption
3 and limτ→∞ {Q(m, τ ; d)} <∞ for all m by Assumption 5, lim infτ→∞ {Q(M(τ ; d), τ ; d)} <
∞. Hence the result. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3. It is helpful to rewrite (19) using as new variables νa(t) ≡ t− φa(t)
and νb(t) ≡ t− φb(t), yielding
ν˙j(t) = 1− 1
λj
L˙
L
(νi(t)), t ≥ σ(0), i = a, b. (72)
Compared to (19), two simplifications arise. First, (72) is an autonomous system, in which
time does not show up as an independent variable. Second, a continuous equilibrium exists if
and only if there exists a solution to (72) that is entirely contained in the bounded set (0,M ]×
(0,M ]. To simplify notation, we will take advantage of the fact that (72) is autonomous to
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write it for any time t ≥ 0. (Formally, this amounts to a time translation of length σ(0),
νi0(t) ≡ νi(t+σ(0)). Without risk of confusion, we hereafter identify ‘νi’ and ‘νi0’.) To guide
the intuition, the phase portrait of (72) is illustrated in Figure 3.
-
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Figure 3 The phase portrait of (72) and the unique continuous equilibrium.
We first prove existence. To do so, we first need to establish two intermediary results.
Regarding the second one, recall that for each λ > 0, Mλ = (L˙/L)
−1(λ), and that, by
Assumption 4, L˙/L is strictly decreasing over (0,M ].
Claim 4 In any continuous equilibrium, µa(τ) > µb(τ) for all τ > 0.
Proof. We equivalently prove that νa(t) > νb(t) for all t > 0. From (72) along with the
fact that σa(0) = σb(0) = σ(0), one has ν˙a(0) > ν˙b(0) as λa > λb. Hence νa(t) > νb(t) for
all t close to but strictly greater than zero. We now show that νa > νb over (0,∞). Suppose
the contrary holds, and let t0 ≡ inf {t > 0 : νa(t) ≤ νb(t)}. But then νa(t0) = νb(t0) and
ν˙a(t0) ≤ ν˙b(t0), in contradiction with (72). The claim follows. ¥
Claim 5 In any continuous equilibrium,
µa(τ) > Mλa and µ
b(τ) < Mλb , τ ≥ 0. (73)
Proof. We prove equivalently that νa(t) > Mλa and, symmetrically, that ν
b(t) < Mλb
for all t ≥ 0. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that νa(t) ≤ Mλa for such t, and start
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with the case where νa(t) < Mλa . Then, by definition of Mλa , (L˙/L)(ν
a(t)) > λa and
thus, by (72), ν˙b(t) < 1 − λa/λb < 0. Hence ta ≡ inf {s > t : νa(s) ≥ Mλa} must be
finite, for, otherwise, (νa, νb) would eventually leave (0,M ]× (0,M ], in contradiction to the
assumption that (σa, σb) is an equilibrium. Hence νa(ta) = Mλa and ν˙
a(ta) ≥ 0. By (72),
this implies that (L˙/L)(νb(ta)) ≤ λa, so that νb(ta) ≥ Mλa = νa(ta), which, as ta > 0,
is impossible by Claim 4. This contradiction establishes that νa(t) ≥ Mλa for all t ≥ 0.
To complete the proof, we must rule out the case νa(t) = Mλa . Suppose first, by way of
contradiction, that this equality holds for some t > 0. Then, by (72) along with Claim 4,
one has ν˙a(t) = 1 − (L˙/L)(νb(t))/λa < 1 − (L˙/L)(νa(t))/λa = 0. Hence νa(s) < Mλa for
all s close to but strictly greater than t, which is impossible according to the first part of
the proof. Suppose finally, by way of contradiction, that νa(0) = Mλa , that is, σ(0) = Mλa .
Then, by (72), ν˙a(0) = 0, so that ν˙b(0) < 0 as λa > λb. Differentiating (72) then yields
ν¨a(0) = − 1
λa
..︷ ︸︸ ︷
(lnL) (σ(0)) ν˙b(σ(0)) < 0.
Because νa(0) = Mλa and ν˙
a(0) = 0, we get that νa(t) < Mλa for all t close to but strictly
greater than zero, which is again impossible according to the first part of the proof. These
contradictions establish that νa(t) > Mλa for all t ≥ 0. The proof that νb(t) < Mλb for all
t ≥ 0 is similar, and is therefore omitted. The claim follows. ¥
In light of our summary of the constant-breakthrough case at the beginning of Section
4.1.1, the interpretation of Claim 5 is that the hare tends to behave less cautiously, and the
tortoise more cautiously, than if they were each facing an opponent of equal strength. A
direct implication of (73) is that Mλa < σ(0) < Mλb .
By Claim 5, the solution to (72) starting at (M,M) does not correspond to an equilibrium.
Hence, as νa(0) = νb(0) in any equilibrium, we can restrict the study of (72) to the open
square M ≡ (0,M) × (0,M). Given a point m ≡ (ma,mb) in M, we denote by ν(·,m) :
t 7→ (νa(t,m), νb(t,m)) the solution to (72) passing through m at t = 0. This solution is
defined over a maximal interval [0, tmax(m)), where tmax(m) ∈ (0,∞]. We need to establish
that there exists some m ≡ (m,m) with m ∈ (Mλa ,Mλb) such that tmax(m) = ∞. We will
use the following notation: I is the segment of the diagonal in M joining (Mλa ,Mλa) to
(Mλb ,Mλb); J a is the segment inM joining (Mλa ,Mλa) to (Mλb ,Mλa); J b is the segment in
M joining (Mλb ,Mλb) to (Mλb ,Mλa); finally J ≡ J a ∪ J b. The proof that an equilibrium
exists consists of two steps.
Step 1 As a preliminary remark, note that any solution ν(·,m) to (72) starting at some
point m ∈ Ra ≡ ((0,Mλb ] × (0,Mλa ]) \ {(Mλb ,Mλa)} is such that tmax(m) < ∞. Indeed,
for any such m, we have, according to (72), (∂νa/∂t)(t,m) ≤ 0, (∂νb/∂t)(t,m) ≤ 0, and
(∂ν/∂t)(t,m) 6= (0, 0) for all t ∈ [0, tmax(m)). This shows that ν(t,m) converges as t goes
to tmax(m) to a point in the closure ClRa \ J a of Ra \ J a. As there is no critical point for
(72) in ClRa \ J a, tmax(m) must be finite. Similarly, any solution ν(·,m) to (72) starting
at some point m ∈ Rb ≡ ([Mλb ,M)× [Mλa ,M)) \ {(Mλb ,Mλa)} is such that tmax(m) <∞.
Observe that, from the above proof, any solution to (72) starting in J \{(Mλb ,Mλa)} meets
this set only once, at time zero.
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Step 2 For each m ∈ I, let
tJ (m) ≡ sup{t ≥ 0 : νa(s,m) ≤Mλb and νb(s,m) ≥Mλa for all s ∈ [0, t]} ∈ [0,∞].
Thus tJ (m) is the first time at which the trajectory ν(·,m) starting at m ∈ I reaches J .
The case tJ (m) = ∞ corresponds to a trajectory that stays in the triangle delimited by
I ∪ J , and thus to an equilibrium. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that tJ (m) <∞ for
all m ∈ I. We must either have
νa(tJ (m),m) =Mλb and ν
b(tJ (m),m) > Mλa
or
νa(tJ (m),m) < Mλb and ν
b(tJ (m),m) =Mλa ,
because (Mλb ,Mλa) is a critical point for (72) and thus cannot be reached in a finite time
tJ (m) from any point m ∈ I. From Step 1, this implies in turn that tJ (m) is the unique
solution of the equation Dist (ν(t,m),J ) = 0. In other words, if νi(t,m) =Mλj for some i,
then t = tJ (m). We now prove that the function tJ is continuous over I. Fix m ∈ I and
assume for instance that νa(tJ (m),m) < Mλb and νb(tJ (m),m) =Mλa . Then
∂(νb −Mλa)
∂t
(tJ (m),m) = 1− 1
λb
L˙
L
(νa(tJ (m),m)) 6= 0. (74)
Because L is twice continuously differentiable, the flow (t,m) 7→ ν(t,m) associated to (72)
is a continuously differentiable mapping (Perko (2001, Section 2.5, Theorem 1, Remark)).
Thus, from (74) along with the implicit function theorem, tJ is continuous, and so is the
mapping Ψ : I → J : m 7→ ν(tJ (m),m). Therefore, as I is connected, Ψ(I) must
be connected in J . Because Ψ(Mλi ,Mλi) = (Mλi ,Mλi) for each i, this implies, given the
structure of J , that (Mλb ,Mλa) ∈ Ψ(I). This, however, is impossible because, as observed
above, (Mλb ,Mλa) is a critical point for (72). This contradiction establishes that there
exists m ∈ I such that tJ (m) = ∞ and thus tmax(m) = ∞, and hence that a continuous
equilibrium exists.
Observe that, by Step 1, any continuous equilibrium must be such that the associated
trajectory ν(·,m) of (72) stays in the interior of the triangle delimited by I ∪ J . Thus,
according to (72), (∂νa/∂t)(t,m) > 0 and (∂νb/∂t)(t,m) < 0, so that µa(τ) is strictly
increasing in τ and µb(τ) is strictly decreasing in τ . Two consequences follow. First, as
µa(0) = µb(0) = σ(0), we get that µa(τ˜a) > µb(τ˜ b) unless τ˜a = τ˜ b = 0. Second, as
(µa(τ), µb(τ)) ∈ (0,M) × (0,M) for all τ , (µa(τ), µb(τ)) has a limit as τ goes to infinity,
which must be (Mλb ,Mλa), the unique critical point of (72) in the triangle delimited by
I ∪ J .
It remains to prove uniqueness. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist two
continuous equilibria. According to the above remark, this implies that there exist two
distinct points m1 ≡ (m1,m1) and m2 ≡ (m2,m2) in I such that both ν(t,m1) and
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ν(t,m2) converge to (Mλb ,Mλa) as t goes to infinity. With no loss of generality, assume that
m1 > m2. Let us first observe that
νi(t,m1) > ν
i(t,m2), t ≥ 0, i = a, b. (75)
Indeed, if this were not the case, there would for instance exist some t > 0 such that
νa(t,m1) = ν
a(t,m2) and ν
i(s,m1) > ν
i(s,m2) for all s ∈ [0, t) and i = a, b. But then,
because L˙/L is strictly decreasing over (0,M ],
νa(t,m1) = m1 +
∫ t
0
∂νa
∂t
(s,m1) ds
= m1 +
∫ t
0
[
1− 1
λa
L˙
L
(νb(s,m1))
]
ds
> m2 +
∫ t
0
[
1− 1
λa
L˙
L
(νb(s,m2))
]
ds
= m2 +
∫ t
0
∂νa
∂t
(s,m2) ds
= νa(t,m2),
which is ruled out by assumption. This contradiction establishes (75). We now show that
ν(t,m1) and ν(t,m1) tend to drift apart from each other, which concludes the proof. Define
ga,b(t) ≡ 1
2
‖ν(t,m1)− ν(t,m2)‖2 , t ≥ 0.
Then, for each t ≥ 0, we have, by (72),
g˙a,b(t) =
〈
ν(t,m1)− ν(t,m2), ∂ν
∂t
(t,m1)− ∂ν
∂t
(t,m2)
〉
=
∑
i=a,b
1
λi
[
νi(t,m1)− νi(t,m2)
][ L˙
L
(νj(s,m2)) − L˙
L
(νj(s,m1))
]
,
which is strictly positive according to (75) and the monotonicity of L˙/L. This proves that
ga,b is strictly increasing and in particular that ga,b(t) > ga,b(0) = m1−m2 > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
This, however, is impossible because both ν(t,m1) and ν(t,m2) converge to (Mλb ,Mλa) as
t goes to infinity and thus ga,b(t) converges to zero as t goes to infinity. This contradiction
establishes that there exists a unique continuous equilibrium. Hence the result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. Observe first from the proof of Theorem 3 that
lim
τ→∞
{µb(τ)} =Mλa < Mλa = limτ→∞ {µ
b(τ)} (76)
as λa > λa, so that the result holds for τ large enough. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that µb(τ0) = µ
b(τ0) for some time τ0 or, equivalently, that
φb(t0) = φ
b(t0) (77)
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for some time t0, where, by (19),
φ˙a(t) =
1
λa
L˙
L
(t− φb(t)), φ˙b(t) = 1
λb
L˙
L
(t− φa(t)), t ≥ σ(0), (78)
and
φ˙a(t) =
1
λa
L˙
L
(t− φb(t)), φ˙b(t) = 1
λb
L˙
L
(t− φa(t)), t ≥ σ(0). (79)
The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1 Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
φ˙b(t0) ≥ φ˙b(t0). (80)
Now, observe that, as λa > λa,
φ˙a(t0) > φ˙
a(t0) (81)
by (77)–(79), and that, as L˙/L is strictly decreasing over (0,M ],
φa(t0) ≥ φa(t0) (82)
by (78)–(80). Combining (81) with (82) yields that, for some εa > 0,
φa(t) > φa(t) (83)
for all t ∈ (t0, t0 + εa). Together with (78)–(79), this, as L˙/L is strictly decreasing over
(0,M ], implies that
φ˙b(t) > φ˙b(t) (84)
for all t ∈ (t0, t0 + εa). Similarly, combining (77) with (84) yields that, for some εb > 0,
φb(t) > φb(t) (85)
for all t ∈ (t0, t0+εb). Together with (78)–(79), this, as λa > λa and L˙/L is strictly decreasing
over (0,M ], implies that
φ˙a(t) > φ˙a(t) (86)
for all t ∈ (t0, t0+ εb). More generally, as long as (83) and (85) hold, so do (84) and (86). As
a result, (83) and (85) hold for all t > t0. This, however, is impossible because, according
to (76), t− φb(t) > t− φb(t) for t large enough. This contradiction establishes that, if (77)
holds, then
φ˙b(t0) < φ˙
b(t0). (87)
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Step 2 It is easily checked that, if (77) holds, then φb(t0) = φ
b(t0) > 0. Indeed, if one
had φb(t0) = φ
b(t0) = 0, then it would follow from Lemma 1(iii) that φ
a(t0) = φ
a(t0) = 0
and thus, by (78)–(79), that φ˙
b
(t0) = φ˙
b(t0), which is ruled out by (87). Thus, in particular,
t0 > σ(0)∨ σ(0). Note also that φb and φb cannot cross over [σ(0)∨ σ(0), t0), for, otherwise,
given (87), there would exist some time t1 in this interval such that φ
b(t1) = φ
b(t1) and
φ˙b(t1) ≥ φ˙b(t1), which is ruled out by Step 1. As a result, σ(0) < σ(0) and
φb(t) < φb(t) (88)
for all t ∈ (σ(0), t0), where φb ≡ 0 over (σ(0), σ(0)). Now, observe that, as L˙/L is strictly
decreasing over (0,M ],
φa(t0) < φ
a(t0) (89)
by (78)–(79) and (87). Because σ(0) < σ(0), however,
φa(t) < φa(t) (90)
for all t ∈ (σ(0), σ(0)), where φa ≡ 0 over (σ(0), σ(0)). It follows from (89)–(90) that there
must exist some time t1 in (σ(0), t0) such that φ
a(t1) = φ
a(t1) and φ˙
a(t1) ≤ φ˙a(t1). Together
with (78)–(78), this, as λa > λa and L˙/L is strictly decreasing over (0,M ], implies that
φb(t1) < φ
b(t1), which, according to (88), is impossible. This contradiction establishes that
there is no time t0 such that (77) holds. Hence the result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. We first argue that µa(τ) > µa(τ) for all τ ≥ 0. Observe first
that, by analogy with (76),
lim
τ→∞
{µa(τ)} =Maλ ≡
(
L˙a
La
)−1
(λ) >
(
L˙a
La
)−1
(λ) ≡Maλ = lim
τ→∞
{µa(τ)}
as La dominates La in the growth-rate order, so that the result holds for τ large enough.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that µa(τ0) = µ
a(τ0) for some time τ0 or, equivalently,
that
φa(t0) = φ
a(t0)
for some time t0, where, by (20),
φ˙a(t) =
1
λ
L˙b
Lb
(t− φb(t)), φ˙b(t) = 1
λ
L˙a
La
(t− φa(t)), t ≥ σ(0), (91)
and
φ˙a(t) =
1
λ
L˙b
Lb
(t− φb(t)), φ˙b(t) = 1
λ
L˙a
La
(t− φa(t)), t ≥ σ(0). (92)
The proof then proceeds along the same lines as in Steps 1–2 of the proof of Proposition
5, exchanging the roles of a and b and of · and ·. Observe in particular that σ(0) > σ(0).
Hence the result. ¥
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Appendix B: Additional Proofs and Calculations
B.1 Dynamic Analysis of Example 1
Focusing for concreteness on the publication-delay interpretation of this example, we first
give a sufficient condition for total time from breakthrough to publication evaluated at the
stand-alone maturation delay to decrease in the breakthrough time.
Claim 6 If D12 > 0 and D(M(τ), τ) is nonincreasing in τ, then M(τ) + D(M(τ), τ) is
strictly decreasing in τ .
Proof. Observe that M(τ) satisfies 1 + D1(M(τ), τ) = 0, so that, as D11(M(τ), τ) > 0,
M˙(τ) = − (D12/D11)(M(τ), τ) and D12(M(τ), τ) have opposite signs. Hence M˙ < 0 if
D12 > 0. The claim follows. ¥
An example of a publication-delay function that satisfies the assumptions of Claim 6 is
D(m, τ) =M(τ)2/m, for some function M such that 0 > M˙ > −1.
To illustrate the claim that total time from breakthrough to publication may increase in
equilibrium despite the publication process becoming more efficient, consider the following
specification for the publication delay:
D(m, τ) = I(D(m,∞), τ). (93)
One can interpret D(·,∞) as an asymptotic publication-delay function, and I(·, τ) as a
deformation of the identity function over [0,∞). We shall assume that D˙(·,∞) < 0, that
D¨(·,∞) > 0, and that limm↓0 {D(m,∞)} =∞. As for I, we shall assume that (i) I(0, τ) = 0
for all τ , (ii) I1 > 0, which, together with D˙(·,∞) < 0 ensures that D1 < 0, (iii) I11 > 0,
which, together with (ii) and D¨(·,∞) > 0 ensures that D11 > 0, (iv) limδ→∞ {I(δ, τ)} =∞
for all τ , which, together with limm↓0 {D(m,∞)} = ∞ ensures that limm↓0 {D(m, τ)} = ∞
for all τ , (v) I12 < 0, which, together with (ii) ensures that D12 > 0, and (vi) I1(·, τ)
converges uniformly to 1 as τ goes to infinity. As discussed in the main text, Assumption
(v) implies that the publication process becomes increasingly efficient. Yet, Assumption (vi)
puts an upper bound to these efficiency gains; indeed, it implies that, as τ goes to infinity,
I(·, τ) converges to the identity function over [0,∞) uniformly over compact sets, and that,
as a result, D(·, τ) converges to D(·,∞) uniformly over compact sets. The following claim
then holds.
Claim 7 Suppose that D is given by (93), and that Assumptions (i)–(vi) hold. Then, if
B ≡ G˙/(1−G) increases to infinity, D(µ(τ), τ) goes to infinity as τ goes to infinity.
Proof. In the context of the present example, and given (93), (7) rewrites as
µ˙(τ) =
B(τ)
−r[1 + I1(D(µ(τ),∞), τ)D1(µ(τ),∞)] − 1. (94)
Because B is increasing and D12 > 0 by Assumption (v), µ(τ) is strictly decreasing in τ
and thus converges to a nonnegative limit m as τ goes to infinity. If m were positive, then,
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by Assumption (vi), the denominator of the first term on the right-hand side of (94) would
converge to a finite, nonnegative limit −r[1+D1(m,∞)]. Thus, as B(τ) goes to infinity as τ
goes to infinity, so would µ˙(τ). But then, as lim infτ→∞ {M(τ)} <∞ by Assumption 3, µ(τ)
would exceed M(τ) at some time τ , which is impossible. Thus m = 0 and µ(τ) converges
to zero as τ goes to infinity. To conclude, observe that, by Assumption (vi), there exists τ0
and ε < 1 such that, for each τ ≥ τ0,
D(µ(τ), τ) = I(D(µ(τ),∞), τ) ≥ min
δ∈[0,D(µ(τ),∞)]
{I1(δ, τ)}D(µ(τ),∞) ≥ (1− ε)D(µ(τ),∞),
which goes to infinity as τ goes to infinity. The claim follows. ¥
B.2 Detailed Calculations for Example 3
B.2.1 Checking Assumptions
We first give restrictions on the technological frontier ξ and the inverse demand function P
that ensure that the payoff function
L(m, τ ; d) ≡ exp(−rm)P (Q(m, τ ; d)),
with Q(m, τ ; d) defined by (16), satisfies Assumptions 1–4, and that the corresponding payoff
function expressed in terms of quality,
H(q, τ ; d) ≡ exp(−r[T (q, τ)− τ ])P (q),
satisfies Assumption 7. The following assumptions are hereafter maintained without explicit
reference. Regarding the technological frontier, we shall assume, as in the main text, that ξ
is bounded, with ξ > 0 and ξ˙ > 0, and, as in Proposition 4, that ξ¨ < 0. As for the inverse
demand function, we shall assume that P vanishes at the origin, that P ′ > 0, and that P
is ρP -concave for some ρP > 0. Further restrictions on ξ and P will involve upper bounds
on ξ˙, reflecting that the technological frontier does not move too fast over time, as well as
a concomitant lower bound on ρP , reflecting that consumers of research outputs feature a
willingness to pay for quality increases that decreases fast enough with quality.
Assumption 1 That L(·, τ ; d) only vanishes at the origin follows from the fact that so do
Q(·, τ ; d) and P . To find sufficient conditions under which L1(·, τ ; d) has a unique zeroM(τ),
at which L(·, τ ; d) reaches a maximum and is strongly concave, it is useful to work with the
log-derivative
L1
L
(m, τ ; d) = −r +Q1(m, τ ; d) P
′
P
(Q(m, τ ; d)). (95)
The following claim then holds.
Claim 8 The payoff function satisfies Assumption 1 if ξ˙(0) < ξ(0)ρP r.
Proof. By (16), Q1(0, τ ; d) = ξ(τ) > 0 and hence limm↓0 {(L1/L)(m, τ ; d)} = ∞. We
now show that limm→∞ {(L1/L)(m, τ ; d)} = −r, which implies that L(·, τ ; d) has at least a
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zero. First, by (16) again, limm→∞ {Q1(m, τ ; d)} = dξ(τ) + (1− d) lims→∞ {ξ(s)} <∞ and
limm→∞ {Q(m, τ ; d)} = ∞. Moreover, as P ρP is an increasing concave function for ρP > 0,
limq→∞ {(P ′/P )(q)} = (1/ρP ) limq→∞ {[(P ρP )′/P ρP ](q)} = 0. Substituting in (95) then
yields limm→∞ {(L1/L)(m, τ ; d)} = −r, as claimed. It remains to show that L1(m, τ ; d) = 0
implies that L11(m, τ ; d) < 0 or, equivalently, that (L1/L)1(m, τ ; d) < 0. According to (95),
we have(
L1
L
)
1
(m, τ ; d) = Q11(m, τ ; d)
P ′
P
(Q(m, τ ; d)) +Q1(m, τ ; d)
2
(
P ′
P
)′
(Q(m, τ ; d)). (96)
For each q > 0, (
P ′
P
)′
(q) =
[(
P ′′P
P ′2
− 1
)(
P ′
P
)2]
(q) < −ρP
(
P ′
P
)2
(q). (97)
Substituting (97) into (96) and using (16) yields(
L1
L
)
1
(m, τ ; d) = Q11(m, τ ; d)
P ′
P
(Q(m, τ ; d)) +Q1(m, τ ; d)
2
(
P ′
P
)′
(Q(m, τ ; d))
<
P ′
P
(Q(m, τ ; d))
[
ξ˙(0)− ξ(0)ρP Q1(m, τ ; d) P
′
P
(Q(m, τ ; d))
]
=
P ′
P
(Q(m, τ ; d))[ξ˙(0)− ξ(0)ρP r]
< 0,
where the first inequality follows from (16), taking advantage of ξ˙ > 0 and ξ¨ < 0, and the
equality reflects that, by assumption, (L1/L)(m, τ ; d) as given by (95) is equal to zero. The
claim follows. ¥
Assumption 3 It is useful to check Assumption 3 before turning to Assumptions 2 and 4.
Claim 9 The payoff function satisfies Assumption 3.
Proof. Note first that
Q(M(τ), τ) =
(
P ′
P
)−1(
r
Q1(M(τ), τ)
)
(98)
is uniformly bounded in τ as 0 < ξ(0) < Q1(m, τ) < lims→∞ {ξ(s)} < ∞ for all m and τ .
Next, observe that, by (16),
Q(M(τ), τ) =
∫ M(τ)
0
Q1(m, τ) dm > ξ(0)M(τ) (99)
for all τ , which implies that Assumption 3 is satisfied as Q(M(τ), τ) is uniformly bounded
in τ . The claim follows. ¥
Assumptions 4 and 7 Turning to Assumptions 4 and 7, we show that, given Assumption
56
3, the same condition that ensures that the payoff function satisfies Assumption 1 further
ensures that it satisfies Assumption 4 and that the payoff function expressed in terms of
quality satisfies Assumption 7.
Claim 10 The payoff function satisfies Assumption 4 if ξ˙(0) < ξ(0)ρP r.
Proof. We must show that (44) holds for some ρ > 0. We have
1− LL11
L21
=
Q21(P
′2 − PP ′′)−Q11PP ′
(−rP +Q1P ′)2 . (100)
As shown in the proof of Claim 9, Q(M(τ), τ) is uniformly bounded in τ . Hence, using (16),
we get that the denominator of the right-hand side of (100) is uniformly bounded above over
{(m, τ) : 0 ≤ m < M(τ)},
(−rP +Q1P ′)2 ≤ lim
s→∞
{ξ2(s)} max
q∈[0,supτ ′∈[0,∞){Q(M(τ),τ)}]
{P ′2(q)}. (101)
Thus we only need to check that the numerator of the right-hand side of (100) is bounded
away from zero over this domain. Indeed, we have
Q21(P
′2 − PP ′′)−Q11PP ′ = Q21P ′2
(
1− PP
′′
P ′2
)
−Q11PP ′
≥ Q21P ′2ρP −Q11PP ′
≥ Q1P
′2
r
(Q1ρP r −Q11)
>
ξ(0)
r
max
q∈[0,supτ ′∈[0,∞){Q(M(τ),τ)}]
{P ′2(q)} [ξ(0)ρP r − ξ˙(0)]
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from the ρP -concavity of P , the second inequality follows
from the fact that L(·, τ) is strictly increasing over [0,M(τ)) for each τ , and the third
inequality follows from (16), taking advantage of ξ˙ > 0 and ξ¨ < 0, and from the fact that
Q(M(τ), τ) is uniformly bounded in τ . The claim follows. ¥
Claim 11 The payoff function expressed in terms of quality satisfies Assumption 7 if ξ˙(0) <
ξ(0)ρP r.
Proof. By analogy with (44), we must show that
1− HH11
H21
(q, τ) ≥ ρ, τ ≥ 0, Q(M(τ), τ) > q ≥ 0
for some ρ > 0. We have
1− HH11
H21
=
P ′2 − PP ′′ + rT11P 2
(−rT1P + P ′)2 . (102)
Proceeding as for (101), we get that the denominator of the right-hand side of (102) is
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uniformly bounded above over {(q, τ) : 0 ≤ q < Q(M(τ), τ)}. Thus we only need to check
that the numerator of the right-hand side of (102) is bounded away from zero over this
domain. Indeed, following the same steps as in the proof of Claim 10, we have
P ′2 − PP ′′ − rT11P 2 = P ′2
(
1− PP
′′
P ′2
)
+ rT11P
2
≥ P ′2ρP + rT11P 2
= P ′2ρP − r Q11
Q31
P 2
>
P ′2
rQ1
(Q1ρP r −Q11)
≥ 1
r lims→∞ {ξ(s)} maxq∈[0,supτ ′∈[0,∞){Q(M(τ),τ)}]
{P ′2(q)} [ξ(0)ρP r − ξ˙(0)]
> 0.
The claim follows. ¥
Assumption 2 Finally, we consider Assumption 2.
Claim 12 The payoff function satisfies Assumption 4 if ξ˙(0) < [ξ(0)]2/(P ′/P )−1(r/ξ(0)).
Proof. We have, by (95),
(lnL)11 − (lnL)12 = (Q11 −Q12) P
′
P
+Q1(Q1 −Q2)
(
P ′
P
)′
. (103)
We need to show that this quantity is negative over {(m, τ) : 0 < m ≤M(τ)}. The first term
on the right-hand side of (103) is nonpositive by Assumption 6. Because P is ρP -concave,
the second term is negative if the maturation-technology wedge (Q1 −Q2)(m, τ) is positive
over {(m, τ) : 0 < m ≤M(τ)}. We have, over this domain,
(Q1 −Q2)(m, τ) = ξ(τ)− dξ˙(τ)m
≥ ξ(0)− ξ˙(0)M(τ)
> ξ(0)− ξ˙(0)
ξ(0)
Q(M(τ, τ)
= ξ(0)− ξ˙(0)
ξ(0)
(
P ′
P
)−1(
r
Q1(M(τ), τ)
)
≥ ξ(0)− ξ˙(0)
ξ(0)
(
P ′
P
)−1(
r
ξ(0)
)
> 0,
where the second inequality follows from (99), the second equality follows from (98), the
third inequality follows from (16), and the fourth inequality follows from the assumption
that ξ˙(0) < [ξ(0)]2/(P ′/P )−1(r/ξ(0)). The claim follows. ¥
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B.2.2 On Maturation and Quality
This appendix provides additional material for Section 4.2.3. We start with the following
claim, which is used in the discussion of (18).
Claim 13 For all m > 0, τ ≥ 0, and d ∈ [0, 1],
Q3(m, τ ; d) < 0,(
Q1
Q
)
3
(m, τ ; d) < 0.
Proof. To simplify notation, rewrite (16) as Q(m, τ ; d) = Qf (m, τ)−d[Qf (m, τ)−Ql(m, τ)],
where Qf and Ql respectively correspond to the frontier case (d = 0) and to the lock-in case
(d = 1). We then have
Q3(m, τ ; d) = (Q
l −Qf )(m, τ ; d) = ξ(τ)m−
∫ τ+m
τ
ξ(s) ds
and(
Q1
Q
)
3
(m, τ ; d) =
Ql1Q
f −Qf1Ql
Q2
(m, τ ; d) =
ξ(τ)
Q(m, τ, d)2
[∫ τ+m
τ
ξ(s) ds− ξ(τ +m)m
]
,
which are both negative if m > 0 as ξ˙ > 0. The claim follows. ¥
To illustrate the claim that being closer to the frontier can lead to shorter maturation
delays in equilibrium, consider the following inverse demand function for quality:
P (q) ≡ exp
(
q1−κ
1− κ
)
, (104)
for some constant κ ≥ 2, so that (P ′/P )(q) = 1/qκ. This specification of P is convenient for
computational purposes, yet it requires a little bit of care, as P is not ρP -concave over [0,∞)
for any ρP > 0, though it is log-concave over [0,∞) and ρP (η)-concave for some ρP (η) > 0
over any interval [η,∞) such that η > 0.
Whereas we cannot, therefore, directly apply Claims 8 and 10–11, the details are easy to
fix. The following claim parallels Claim 8.
Claim 14 With P given by (104), the payoff function satisfies Assumption 1 if ξ˙(0) <
2ξ(0)2−1/κr1/κ.
Proof. Now (95) writes as:
L1
L
(m, τ ; d) = −r + Q1(m, τ ; d)
Q(m, τ ; d)κ
. (105)
From (105), it is easily checked along the lines of the proof of Claim 8 that L(·, τ ; d) has
at least a zero. It remains to show that L1(m, τ ; d) = 0 implies that L11(m, τ ; d) < 0 or,
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equivalently, that (L1/L)1(m, τ ; d) < 0. According to (105), we have(
L1
L
)
1
(m, τ ; d) =
Q11(m, τ ; d)
Q(m, τ ; d)κ
− κ Q1(m, τ ; d)
2
Q(m, τ ; d)κ+1
=
1
Q(m, τ ; d)κ
[Q11(m, τ ; d)− κQ1(m, τ ; d)2−1/κr1/κ]
<
1
Q(m, τ ; d)κ
[ξ˙(0)− κξ(0)2−1/κr1/κ]
< 0,
where the second equality reflects that, by assumption, (L1/L)(Q(m, τ ; d)) as given by (105)
is equal to zero, and the first inequality follows from (16), taking advantage of ξ˙ > 0 and
ξ¨ < 0. The claim follows. ¥
As for the analogues of Claims 10–11, we can use the trick described in Appendix C.1.
The idea is to make sure that, in equilibrium, σ never enters a strip {(τ, t) : t− τ ≤ ε}, for
some ε > 0. An easy way to ensure this is to bound above the breakthrough rate G˙/(1−G)
by some positive constant λ. Then there exist positive numbers ε and ζ such that
1
f(m, τ ; d)
≤ λ−r +Q1(m, τ ; d)(P ′/P )(Q(m, τ ; d))
<
λ
−r + ξ(0)(P ′/P )(lims→∞ {ξ(s)}m)
< 1− ζ
for all m ≤ ε and τ , which implies that µ(τ) > ε for all τ in any equilibrium. Note that ξ˙(0)
does not appear in the above bound. As µ(τ) and, therefore, χ(τ ; d), are bounded away from
zero in any equilibrium, we get that the functions {L(·, τ ; d) : τ ≥ 0} and {H(·, τ ; d) : τ ≥ 0}
are uniformly ρ-concave along any equilibrium trajectory. Letting ξ˙(0) be small enough then
allows one to proceed along the same steps as in the proofs of Claim 10–11.
The upshot of this discussion is that if P is given by (104) and if, over time, players
do not become too innovative and the technological frontier does not move too fast, our
equilibrium-uniqueness (Theorem 2) and comparative-statics (Propositions 2 and 4) results
still hold. Hence, to show that, when the inverse demand for quality is given by (104),
being closer to the frontier leads to shorter maturation delays and yet higher quality levels
in equilibrium, we only need to verify the following claim.
Claim 15 With P given by (104), an increase in d leads to an increase in L(·, · ; d) in the
growth-rate order.
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Claim 13. The derivative of the
right-hand side of (105) with respect to d has the same sign as
[κQl1(Q
f −Ql)− (Qf −Ql)1Ql + (1− d)(κ− 1)(Qf −Ql)1(Qf −Ql)](m, τ ; d). (106)
We want to show that, for κ ≥ 2, the quantity (106) is positive if m > 0, uniformly in
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(m, τ ; d). Because d ∈ [0, 1], κ ≥ 2, and because
[(Qf −Ql)1(Qf −Ql)](m, τ) = [ξ(τ +m)− ξ(τ)]
[∫ τ+m
τ
ξ(s) ds− ξ(τ)m
]
is positive if m > 0 as ξ˙ > 0, we can focus on the first two terms in (106). As
[Ql1(Q
f −Ql)](m, τ) = ξ(τ)
[∫ τ+m
τ
ξ(s) ds− ξ(τ)m
]
is positive if m > 0 as ξ˙ > 0, and as κ ≥ 2 by assumption, we only need to find conditions
on ξ such that the quantity[
(Qf −Ql)1Ql
Ql1(Q
f −Ql)
]
(m, τ) =
ξ(τ +m)− ξ(τ)
(1/m)
∫ τ+m
τ
ξ(s) ds− ξ(τ) ≡ Ξ(m, τ)
is bounded above by 2, uniformly in (m, τ). Indeed, as ξ¨ < 0, it follows from the Hermite–
Hadamard inequality that,44 for all m > 0 and τ ≥ 0,
ξ(τ) + ξ(τ +m)
2
<
1
m
∫ τ+m
τ
ξ(s) ds.
Rearranging and using the fact that (1/m)
∫ τ+m
τ
ξ(s) ds > ξ(τ) as ξ˙ > 0, we get that
supm∈(0,∞){Ξ(m, τ)} ≤ 2 for all τ ≥ 0, as requested. The claim follows. ¥
B.3 Further Results on the Hare and the Tortoise
We investigate here the impact on the hare’s equilibrium maturation delay of an increase
in her own breakthrough rate. To do so, a few technical observations are in order. Recall
first from the proof of Theorem 3 that the unique continuous equilibrium corresponds to the
unique trajectory of (72) that converges to its critical point (Mλb ,Mλa). The vector field
corresponding to (72) is given by
f(m) =
(
1− (1/λa)(L˙/L)(mb)
1− (1/λb)(L˙/L)(ma)
)
at any point m ≡ (ma,mb) in M. For each i, let
ρi ≡ −
..︷ ︸︸ ︷
(lnL) (Mλi) =
(
L˙2 − LL¨
L2
)
(Mλi) (107)
and
δ ≡
√
ρaρb
λaλb
. (108)
44Observe, alternatively, that the uniform distribution over [τ, τ+m] second-order stochastically dominates
the two-point distribution that puts equal weights on τ and τ +m.
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By Assumption 1, δ > 0. The Jacobian of f at its critical point (Mλb ,Mλa) is
Df(Mλb ,Mλa) =
(
0 ρb/λa
ρa/λb 0
)
and its eigenvalues are therefore δ and −δ. As δ > 0, this shows that the critical point
(Mλb ,Mλa) of f is hyperbolic (Perko (2001, Section 2.6, Definition 1)). Suppose from now
on that L is thrice continuously differentiable, so that f is twice continuously differentiable
in the neighborhood of (Mλb ,Mλa). Then, according to Hartman (1960, Theorem (IV)),
there exists a C1-diffeomorphism H from a neighborhood U of (Mλb ,Mλa) onto an open set
containing the origin such that H linearizes the system ν˙ = f(ν), locally transforming it
into the linear system ν˙ = Df(Mλb ,Mλa)ν. Thus, for each m0 ∈ U , one can locally write
H(ν(t,m0)) = e
Df(M
λb
,Mλa )tH(m0).
Now, let S be the stable manifold of the nonlinear system ν˙ = f(ν) (Perko (2001, Section
2.7, Theorem)), the upper branch of which corresponds to the equilibrium trajectory (νa, νb).
Then, according to Theorem 3, there exists t0 ≥ 0 such that (νa(t), νb(t)) ∈ S ∩ U for all
t ≥ t0. As H maps S onto the stable subspace {Cξ−δ : C ∈ R} of the linear system
ν˙ = Df(Mλb ,Mλa)ν associated to the eigenvalue −δ, we get that there exists a nonzero
scalar constant C such that for any large enough t,
(νa(t), νb(t)) = H−1(exp(−δt)Cξ−δ).
From Proposition 3 again, along with the fact that the derivative of H−1 at the origin is the
identity, it follows in turn that
‖(νa(t), νb(t))− (Mλb ,Mλa)− exp(−δt)Cξ−δ)‖ = o(exp(−δt)),
which implies
lim
t→∞
{exp(δt)[(νa(t), νb(t))− (Mλb ,Mλa)]} = Cξ−δ, (109)
upon multiplying by exp(δt). Hence the equilibrium maturation delays νa(t) and νb(t)
converge exponentially fast to their limit values Mλb and Mλa .
We now how to use this result to study the impact on the hare’s equilibrium maturation
delay of an increase in her own breakthrough rate. Observe first from the proof of Theorem 3
that a change in λa does not affect the limit Mλb of ν
a(t) as t goes to infinity. It thus follows
from (109) that it is sufficient to study how the eigenvalue δ defined in (108) varies with λa:
a higher value of δ translates into a faster convergence of νa(t) to Mλb as t goes to infinity
and thus, as νa(t) < Mλb for all t, into asymptotically longer maturation delays. From
(107)–(108) and the definition of Mλ, we just need to study the variations of the mapping
λ 7→ − S
′(S−1(λ))
λ
= − 1
λ(S−1)′(λ)
,
where S ≡ L˙/L. The derivative of this mapping has the same sign as
(S−1)′(λ) + λ(S−1)′′(λ).
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Example 1 Suppose that L is given by
L(m) = exp
(
−r
[
m+M ln
(
M
m
)])
, M ≥ m ≥ 0, (110)
that is, D(m, τ) =M ln(M/m) in Example 1. Then
S−1(λ) =Mλ =
r
λ+ r
M,
so that
sgn ((S−1)′(λ) + λ(S−1)′′(λ)) = sgn
(
− 1
(λ+ r)2
+
2λ
(λ+ r)3
)
= sgn (λ− r).
Thus, if λa < r, a small increase in the hare’s breakthrough rate λa shortens her equilibrium
maturation delay for large values of her breakthrough time, whereas the opposite is true if
λa > r.
Example 3 Suppose that L is given by
L(m) = exp(−rm)[exp(ξm)− 1], m ≥ 0, (111)
where r > ξ > 0, that is, Q(m, τ) = ξm and P (q) = exp(q)− 1 in Example 3. Then
S−1(λ) =Mλ =
1
ξ
ln
(
r
r − ξ
)
,
so that
sgn ((S−1)′(λ) + λ(S−1)′′(λ)) = sgn
(
1
λ+ r
− 1
λ+ r − ξ + λ
[
1
(λ+ r − ξ)2 −
1
(λ+ r)2
])
= sgn
(
λ
(
1
λ+ r − ξ +
1
λ+ r
)
− 1
)
= sgn (λ2 − r(r − ξ)).
Thus, if λa <
√
r(r − ξ), a small increase in the hare’s breakthrough rate λa shortens the
hare’s equilibrium maturation delay for large values of her breakthrough time, whereas the
opposite is true if λa >
√
r(r − ξ).
The intuition for these results is as follows. According to Theorem 3, the tortoise’s
equilibrium maturation delay is close to Mλa when she has a late breakthrough. Now,
when the payoff function L is given by (110) or (111), it is straightforward to see that the
maturation delay Mλa is convex in λ
a. Therefore, the limit of the tortoise’s maturation
delay is less sensitive to an increase in the hare’s breakthrough rate when the hare’s initial
breakthrough rate is high than when it is low. When the hare has a late breakthrough
herself, she is thus less threatened by preemption at the margin in the former case than in
the latter case, and she is ready to let her breakthrough mature more: the direct effect of an
increase in the hare’s breakthrough rate asymptotically dominates the indirect effect that
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works through the modification of the tortoise’s equilibrium behavior. This prediction is
reversed if the hare’s initial breakthrough rate is initially lower, for then an increase in it has
a large impact on the tortoise’s limit equilibrium behavior. This second scenario, however,
is perhaps less realistic than the first, for it is likely that, in practice, λa is large relative to
r (in Example 1) or to
√
r(r − ξ) (in Example 3).
B.4 Follower Value
We have focused on the case where there is no value in being a follower. Yet, in practice,
being preempted on a given topic does not necessarily mean for a researcher that she should
lose all opportunities to publish related work: indeed, standing on the shoulders of her
predecessors, she can in turn publish follow-up research, the quality of which often depends
on the latter’s achievements. In our competitive context, it is natural to postulate that the
leader’s and the follower’s contributions are substitutes, and that the leader sets the tone for
future research as soon as she discloses her results: that is, the current value of becoming a
follower is a decreasing function F c(m) of the leader’s maturation delay m.45 Assume that
F c is differentiable and that L(M) > exp(−rM)F c(M) ≥ 0, where r denotes the players’
discount rate.46 Player i’s payoff if her type is τ i, player j’s strategy is σj, and player i plans
to make a move at time ti ≥ τ i is
W i(ti, τ i, σj) ≡ {P[σj(τ˜ j) > ti] + αP[σj(τ˜ j) = ti]}L(ti − τ i)
+P[σj(τ˜ j) < ti]E
[
exp(−r[σj(τ˜ j)− τ i])F c(σj(τ˜ j)− τ˜ j) |σj(τ˜ j) < ti].
In a symmetric separating equilibrium with common continuous strategy σ, the problem
faced by type τ i of player i is
max
ti∈[τ i,∞)
{
[1−G(φ(ti))]L(ti − τ i) +
∫ φ(ti)
φ(τ i)
exp(−r[σ(τ j)− τ i])F c(σ(τ j)− τ j) dG(τ j)
}
,
where φ ≡ σ−1. The first-order condition is
[1−G(φ(ti))]L˙(ti − τ i) = G˙(φ(ti))φ˙(ti)[L(ti − τ i)− exp(−r(ti − τ i))F c(ti − φ(ti))].
Note that the expected marginal cost from an additional delay dti is lower than when the
follower’s value is zero. In a symmetric equilibrium, this first-order condition must hold for
τ i = φ(ti), leading to the ODE
φ˙(t) =
1−G
G˙
(φ(t))
L˙
L− F (t− φ(t)), t ≥ σ(0), (112)
where F (m) ≡ exp(−rm)F c(m) for all m ∈ [0,M ]. Let MF be the unique root of L = F .
We look for an equilibrium in which players spend at least MF time units maturing their
breakthroughs, so that φ stays in the domain DF ≡ {(t, τ) : MF ≤ τ +MF < t < τ +M}.
45For simplicity, we suppose throughout this appendix that payoffs are independent of breakthrough times,
and we let M be the point at which L reaches its maximum.
46Recall that L is evaluated in breakthrough-time terms and is therefore already a present value.
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Assume for simplicity that L is concave over [0,M ], so that the function L˙/(L−F ) is strictly
decreasing over (MF ,M ]. One can then straightforwardly adapt the proofs of Theorems 1–2
to show that there exists a unique equilibrium of the postulated form.
An increase in F has a mechanical effect on the domain DF : it shrinks as F increases.
The following comparative-statics result then holds.
Proposition 7 Let µ (µ) be the equilibrium maturation delay under the follower value F
(F ). Then, if F > F over (0,M), we have µ(τ) > µ(τ) for all τ .
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that µ(τ0) ≤ µ(τ0) for some τ0 ≥ 0. Then, it
follows from (112) that
µ˙(τ0) =
G˙
1−G (τ0)
L− F
L˙
(µ(τ0)) >
G˙
1−G (τ0)
L− F
L˙
(µ(τ0)) = µ˙(τ0),
so that µ(τ) > µ(τ) for all τ > τ0 close enough to τ0. As in Proposition 2, we can deduce
from this that µ > µ over (τ0,∞). Defining g as in (52), the analogues of (53)–(54) hold;
actually, g is bounded above by M −MF . For each τ ≥ τ0, we have
g˙(τ) =
G˙
1−G (τ)
[
L− F
L˙
(µ(τ))− L− F
L˙
(µ(τ))
]
≥ G˙
1−G (τ)
[
L− F
L˙
(µ(τ))− L− F
L˙
(µ(τ))
]
≥ G˙(τ)
1−G(τ) g(τ),
where the inequality follows from the fact that F > F , and the second inequality follows
along the same lines as (48), using the fact that
.︷ ︸︸ ︷(
L− F
L˙
)
(m) = 1− F˙
L˙
(m)− (L− F )L¨
L˙2
(m) ≥ 1
for all m ∈ [MF ,M). The remainder of the proof is as in the proof of Proposition 2. Hence
the result. ¥
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Appendix C: On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this appendix, we show that Assumptions 3–4 and 7 can be considerably relaxed while
preserving our equilibrium-uniqueness and comparative-statics results. The general idea is
that the lower bounds (48), (55)–(56), or (71) on the derivative of the gap between two
candidate equilibria, maturation delays, or quality levels are not particularly tight, as they
are obtained by bounding below the derivative of (L/L1)(·, τ) or (H/H1)(·, τ) uniformly over
[0,M(τ)] or [0, Q(M(τ), τ)], without using the information that the relevant terms of the
difference are equilibrium objects. We show in this appendix that taking into account this
information can help improve our results in a significant way. We focus on the equilibrium-
uniqueness problem; comparative-statics results can be handled in a similar way.
C.1 A Cheap but Useful Trick
A key difficulty that may arise in applications is that the functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0} may
fail to be uniformly ρ-concave. An example is provided in Appendix B.2.2: in the context
of Example 2, it is easy to exhibit an inverse demand function P such that, for each τ , the
resulting payoff function L(·, τ) is log-concave, that is, 0-concave, but not ρ-concave over
[0,M(τ)] for any ρ > 0. Here, the difficulty is only what arises at m = 0. Supposing for
concreteness that M(τ) is bounded away from zero, a simple but effective trick is to try and
find positive numbers ε, ρ, and ζ such that
(i) For all m ≤ ε and τ , 1/f(m, τ) < 1− ζ.
(ii) For each τ, L(·, τ) is ρ-concave over [ε,M(τ)].
Condition (i) implies that, in equilibrium, σ never enters the strip {(τ, t) : t − τ ≤ ε}, for,
otherwise, σ would leave D′ through its lower boundary t = τ . Condition (ii) in turn states
that the functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0} are uniformly ρ-concave over the remaining relevant
domain, so that the proof of Theorem 2 goes through unchanged. The power of this simple
argument is illustrated in Appendix B.2.2.
C.2 A More Refined ρ-Concavity Argument
In Appendix C.1, the lack of ρ-concavity of the functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0} was confined to a
strip of height ε above the diagonal t = τ . This allowed for a straightforward generalization
of Theorem 2. What if, by contrast, the lack of ρ-concavity is more pervasive? To address
this question, and to show that equilibrium uniqueness may still obtain, we consider a simple
parametric example. Specifically, let D(m, τ) =M(τ) ln(M(τ)/m) in Example 1, so that
L(m, τ) = exp
(
−r
[
m+M(τ) ln
(
M(τ)
m
)])
for some continuously differentiable function M : [0,∞) → (0,∞) such that 1 + M˙ > 0.
Assumptions 1–2 are satisfied. By contrast, if Assumption 3 is not satisfied, that is, if
limτ→∞ {M(τ)} = ∞, then Assumption 4 is also not satisfied. Indeed, the ρ-concavity of
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L(·, τ) at each m ∈ [0,M(τ)),
1− LL11
L21
(m, τ) =
M(τ)
r[M(τ)−m]2 ,
then goes to zero as τ goes to infinity. This implies that there is no ρ > 0 such that
the functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0} are uniformly ρ-concave, though they are uniformly log-
concave. But, unlike in the situation dealt with in Appendix C.1, there exists no strip of
finite height above the diagonal t = τ such that the functions {L(·, τ) : τ ≥ 0} are uniformly
ρ-concave, even for τ large enough. Thus no straightforward generalization of Theorem 2
seems forthcoming.
We now show how to use the key information that, in (48), the maturation delays in
[σ1(τ) − τ, σ2(τ) − τ ] are equilibrium maturation delays, to derive a lower bound on the
ρ-concavity of the payoff function, evaluated along the equilibrium trajectory. Let us assume
for simplicity that breakthroughs are exponentially distributed, that is, G˙/(1 − G) = λ for
some positive constant λ. Then the vector field associated to (37) is given by
1
f(t, τ)
=
λ(t− τ)
r[M(τ)− t+ τ ] . (113)
Of particular interest are the isoclines of (113), that is, the curves τ 7→ tα(τ) defined by
1/f(tα(τ), τ) = α for α ≥ 0. According to (113),
tα(τ) = τ +
α
α + λ/r
M(τ) (114)
for all τ . Observe that if (σ, σ) is an equilibrium, then, by (37), σ finds itself at any time τ
on the σ˙(τ)-isocline, that is,
tσ˙(τ)(τ) = σ(τ). (115)
Moreover, by (114), one has, for each τ ,
t˙σ˙(τ)(τ) = 1 +
σ˙(τ)
σ˙(τ) + λ/r
M˙(τ). (116)
From now on, let us assume that M is strictly convex, with limτ→∞ {M˙(τ)} = ∞, so that
Assumption 3 is clearly violated. Then the following property holds.
Claim 16 If (σ, σ) is an equilibrium, then, for each τ,
σ˙(τ) ≥ 1 + σ˙(τ)
σ˙(τ) + λ/r
M˙(τ). (117)
Proof. Suppose by, way of contradiction, that
σ˙(τ0) < 1 +
σ˙(τ0)
σ˙(τ0) + λ/r
M˙(τ0) (118)
for some τ0. Then, applying (115)–(116) at τ = τ0, it follows that σ(τ) < tσ˙(τ0)(τ) for all
τ > τ0 close enough to τ0. We show that in that case σ < tσ˙(τ0) over (τ0,∞). Suppose the
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contrary holds, so that τ1 ≡ inf {τ > τ0 : σ(τ) ≥ tσ˙(τ0)(τ)} < ∞. Then σ(τ1) = tσ˙(τ0)(τ1).
However, as σ < tσ˙(τ0) over (τ0, τ1), we have σ˙ < σ˙(τ0) over (τ0, τ1) by definition of the
isocline tσ˙(τ0). Thus, using (115)–(116), (118), and the convexity of M , we get that
σ(τ1) < σ(τ0) + σ˙(τ0)(τ1 − τ0) < σ(τ0) +
∫ τ1
τ0
[
1 +
σ˙(τ0)
σ˙(τ0) + λ/r
M˙(τ)
]
dτ = tσ˙(τ0)(τ1),
a contradiction. Hence σ < tσ˙(τ0) over (τ0,∞), as claimed, so that σ˙ < σ˙(τ0) over (0,∞).
This, together with the fact that, by (114) along with the assumption that limτ→∞ {M˙(τ)} =
∞, we have limτ→∞ {t˙α(τ)} =∞ for all α > 0, implies that there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that
σ(τ) < tα(τ) for any large enough τ , so that σ˙(τ) < α < 1 for any such τ . But then
σ would eventually leave D′ through its lower boundary t = τ , which is impossible. This
contradiction establishes the claim. ¥
We are now ready to complete the uniqueness argument. According to (117), we have
σ˙(τ) ≥ α(τ) ≡
M˙(τ)− λ/r + 1 +
√
[M˙(τ)− λ/r + 1]2 + 4λ/r
2
(119)
for all τ . Thus σ(τ) = tσ˙(τ)(τ) ≥ tα(τ)(τ), that is, according to (114) and (119),
σ(τ)− τ ≥
M˙(τ)− λ/r + 1 +
√
[M˙(τ)− λ/r + 1]2 + 4λ/r
M˙(τ) + λ/r + 1 +
√
[M˙(τ)− λ/r + 1]2 + 4λ/r
M(τ).
This in turn provides a lower bound for the ρ-concavity of L(·, τ) at m = σ(τ)− τ ,
1− LL11
L21
(σ(τ)− τ, τ) = M(τ)
r[M(τ)− σ(τ) + τ ]2
≥
r
[
M˙(τ) + λ/r + 1 +
√
[M˙(τ)− λ/r + 1]2 + 4λ/r
]2
4λ2M(τ)
. (120)
Fix some ε > 0. Because M is convex with limτ→∞ {M˙(τ)} = ∞, there exists τ0 such that
rM˙(τ) ≥ 4λ(1 + ε) for all τ ≥ τ0. It then follows from (120) that for any such τ ,
1− LL11
L21
(σ(τ)− τ, τ) ≥ (1 + ε)M˙(τ)
λM(τ)
. (121)
Observe that τ0 and the bound (121) are independent of the equilibrium under consideration.
Now, consider two equilibria (σ1, σ1) and (σ2, σ2) with σ1(0) ≥ σ2(0) and define the function
g as in (45). Given that G˙/(1−G) = λ, proceeding as in (48) yields
g˙(τ) ≥ λ min
m∈[σ2(τ)−τ,σ1(τ)−τ ]
{
1− LL11
L21
(m, τ)
}
g(τ) ≥ (1 + ε)M˙(τ)
M(τ)
g(τ) (122)
for all τ ≥ τ0, where the second inequality follows from (121), using the fact that each
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m ∈ [σ2(τ)− τ, σ1(τ)− τ ] is such that m = σ(τ)− τ for some equilibrium (σ, σ). Integrating
(122) yields
g(τ) ≥
[
M(τ)
M(τ0)
]1+ε
g(τ0)
and thus, by (47),
0 ≤ g(τ0) ≤M(τ0)1+εM(τ)−ε
for all τ ≥ τ0. As limτ→∞ {M(τ)} = ∞ and ε > 0, this shows that g(τ0) = 0 and thus
that σ1(τ0) = σ2(τ0). From the uniqueness part of the Cauchy–Lipschitz theorem, we finally
obtain that σ1 = σ2. Hence the equilibrium is unique.
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